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INSULAR AUTONOMY:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT SETTLEMENT? 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORSICA  
AND THE ÅLAND ISLANDS1 
 
Farimah Daftary2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to undertake a comparative evaluation of autonomy as 
a method of conflict settlement based on two case studies of insular regions in 
Western Europe: the Åland Islands and Corsica.  It will highlight the factors 
which have contributed to the success of conflict settlement in the case of 
Åland and draw some lessons from the failure of conflict regulation thus far in 
Corsica. It then proceeds to analyse the "Matignon Process" (December 1999-
July 2000) which culminated in a compromise document presented by French 
Government on 20 July 2000 to the Corsican representatives. Although its 
prospects for success are mixed, this is the most significant effort to date by the 
French Government to resolve the conflict in Corsica through an open and 
democratic political dialogue with elected representatives of the Corsican 
population. The measures proposed will result in a third statute and a limited 
form of autonomy for Corsica, pending constitutional revisions by 2004. This 
paper will also offer some thoughts on the potential impact of the Corsican 
reforms on other French regions and territories. 
 
                                               
1 This paper was presented at the Seventh ISSEI Conference “Approaching a New Millennium: 
Lessons from the Past”(Bergen, Norway, 14-18 August 2000), Workshop 327: “Managing and Settling 
Ethnic Conflicts” organised by Dr. Stefan Wolff (University of Bath) and Ulrich Schneckener (Institute 
for Intercultural and International Studies - InIIS, University of Bremen). It is based to a large extent on 
the results of a joint seminar by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) and the Åland Islands 
Peace Institute  “Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Åland Islands Compared” 
(Helsinki and Mariehamn, 25-30 August 1998) (Loughlin and Daftary 1999). The author wishes to 
thank Professor John Loughlin and Dr. Claude Olivesi for their invaluable help and expertise 
concerning Corsica, Robert Jansson and Carina Aaltonen of the Åland Islands Peace Institute, as well 
as Professor Ruth Lapidoth. 
2 Farimah Daftary is a Research Associate at ECMI in Flensburg, Germany.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite hopes for the contrary, Europe has carried most of its conflicts with it into the 
new century.  Over the past decade, "older" ethnic conflicts have persisted in Western 
Europe while a plethora of "newer" ones have appeared predominantly in Southeast 
Europe and in the former Soviet Union. With the intensified interest in resolving 
ethnic conflicts in Europe, a renewed search for models and solutions has 
characterised much of the academic but also practitioners’ research.  Major 
developments have occurred in Eastern as well as in Western Europe, notably 
devolution in Great Britain and the "Good Friday Agreement" over Northern Ireland.  
With the persisting malaise in Corsica and in other regions, France more than ever 
stands out as the black sheep of Western Europe.  Despite two waves of institutional 
reform in Corsica (in 1982 and 1991) and a double strategy of the French Government 
of repression and negotiation with the clandestine nationalist organisations, the island 
has been plagued by economic under-development, chronic political instability and 
violence since the 1970s. The assassination of the French Prefect in Corsica, Claude 
Erignac, in February 1998 and the fiasco of the subsequent strong-handed 
Government policy of "re-establishing the rule of law" led to the realisation by both 
the Government as well as the Corsican population that a lasting solution had to be 
found to enable the island to develop to its full potential and to see a new era of peace.  
In December 1999, Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin initiated a process of 
dialogue with elected representatives from the Corsican Assembly.  The "Matignon 
Process", named after the Prime Minister's office in Paris, culminated in a 
compromise document on 20 July 2000 in which the French Government proposed 
broad changes which will result in a third statute and a limited form of autonomy for 
Corsica, pending constitutional revisions by 2004. Much will also depend on the 
parties in power after the 2002 French general elections.  
 
The aim of this paper is to undertake a comparative evaluation of autonomy as a 
method of conflict settlement based on two case studies of insular regions in Western 
Europe: the Åland Islands and Corsica.  It also seeks to highlight the factors which 
have contributed to the success of conflict settlement (in the case of Åland) and to its 
relative failure (in the case of Corsica, thus far) and will draw some lessons for the 
current attempts at establishing limited autonomy in Corsica.  
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The experience of the Åland Islands is often mentioned as a model of successful 
settlement of a minority conflict and a territorial dispute between Sweden and Finland 
through the establishment of autonomy in 1920-22, with the help of the League of 
Nations. Autonomy was further developed jointly by the Finnish and Åland 
authorities. The example of Åland's autonomy or elements of it, and the process of 
evolution of autonomy in stages, will offer some insight into conflict settlement in 
Corsica through the development of an adapted form of autonomy.   
 
This comparison between two insular regions offers a second advantage: that of 
addressing the "Corsican Question" from a more comprehensive perspective, 
including not only the issue of protection of the island's specific identity but also 
touching upon the challenges which it faces due to its insularity.  Indeed, insular 
regions (which represent more than 10% of the territory of the EU and 4% of the EU 
population with 14 million insular inhabitants) have been recognised in the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) as ultra-peripheral regions or as under-developed regions 
facing specific problems.3  Interest in addressing these challenges is naturally boosted 
because of the special structural EU funds associated with it.  Because of the 
conviction of in France and in Corsica until recently that the solution to Corsica's 
problems lay in designing the right development policies, and because of the 
sensitivity of autonomy and other asymmetric solutions, the angle of insularity offered 
a useful framework for discussion.  However, due to the loss in 1999 by Corsica of 
"objective 1" status (granted by the EU to regions which are economically under-
developed, manifested by a GDP inferior to 75% of the national average), there was 
increased nervousness regarding the future of the island.  While the 1980s were 
marked by a new regionalist approach (Keating 1998: 72-111)4 and the renewed 
importance of territorial politics, the end of the 1990s have been marked by 
intensified demands for autonomy by various actors in Corsica. Devolution and 
                                               
3 The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) stated that the European Community should seek to reduce the gap 
between more developed regions and less developed regions or islands.  Furthermore, the annex to the 
Amsterdam Treaty recognised the structural handicaps faced by insular regions due to their insularity 
which represents a permanent obstacle to their economic and social development.  It therefore calls for  
special measures to be taken so that these regions may be better integrated (The text of the Treaty on 
European Union may be found at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/index.html). 
4 This new regionalism was characterised by a search for new mechanisms for managing the impact of 
economic change on territories, focussing more on the contribution of the regions themselves and less 
on the directing and planning policies of the state; at the same time there is a revalorisation of local and 
minority cultures. 
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discussions about autonomy and minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe, as 
well as the recognition of the importance of diversity by leading European 
organisations such as the Council of Europe have also certainly had an impact on the 
political debate in Corsica and in Paris.   
 
After a short introduction to the concept of autonomy and issues to be considered, and 
having presented the main characteristics of Corsica and the Åland Islands, this paper 
will offer an overview of the origins of the two conflicts as well as state responses.  It 
will continue with an evaluation of the success of conflict regulation in the two cases 
with special consideration to the following criteria: containment of the conflict, 
preservation and promotion of the minority or territorial identity, as well as general 
political and institutional stability. The general contents of the Matignon Compromise 
of 20 July 2000 and the process which led up to it will then be assessed.  In the fifth 
section, we shall seek to draw some lessons from these two case studies, identifying 
the factors which contributed to a successful autonomy regime in the Åland Islands 
and offering some thoughts on the potential of conflict settlement in Corsica through 
the establishment of autonomy.  It shall conclude with some general thoughts on the 
impact of the Corsican reforms on other French regions and territories.  
 
II. AUTONOMY AND FACTORS THAT MAY INCREASE ITS SUCCESS 
 
According to McGarry and O’Leary (McGarry and O’Leary 1993), conflict regulation 
methods may be divided into two broad categories: those aimed at eliminating 
differences, and those aimed at managing differences; combinations of these two 
methods may also be found. The latter category is further divided into four main sub-
categories:   (a) hegemonic control; (b) arbitration  or third-party intervention; (c) 
cantonisation and /or federalisation; and (d) consociationalism or power-sharing.  
Autonomy falls into category (c): "overlapping cantonisation and federalism there 
exists a grey area of territorial management of ethnic differences which is often found 
in conjunction with external arbitration" (McGarry and O’Leary 1993: 32).  It is this 
"grey area" that we will seek to clarify.  
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A. Definition and Role of Autonomy  
 
Although by no means a new concept, autonomy has enjoyed increasing interest in 
Europe in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet and Yugoslav Federations. 
According to a leading expert on autonomy (Lapidoth 1997: 3), "Autonomy is a means 
for diffusion of powers in order to preserve the unity of a state while respecting the 
diversity of its population; it has been successful in some cases and failed in others."  
The word itself derives from the Greek: auto meaning self, and nomos, law or rule.  In 
some definitions, decentralisation may be considered a form of autonomy while in the 
French context for example the word "autonomie" is almost synonymous with  
independence.  In this analysis, we shall adopt a definition according to which there 
must be an autonomous entity with powers of legislation, administration and 
adjudication in specific areas (this is called "political autonomy" as opposed to 
"administrative autonomy" which is limited to powers in the sphere of administration) 
(Lapidoth 1997: 33).  Territorial political autonomy refers to an arrangement which 
aims at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, 
but that constitutes a majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its 
distinctive identity (Lapidoth 1997: 33).  Other territorial arrangements exist for the 
diffusion of powers, namely federalism, decentralisation, self-government, associate 
statehood and self-administration (Lapidoth 1997: 49-58).  As with decentralisation, 
autonomy involves a devolution of power from the centre to the periphery; however, 
it differs from decentralisation in that powers are not merely delegated but transferred; 
they may thus not be revoked without consulting with the autonomous entity.  
Furthermore,  contrary to decentralisation, the central government may only interfere 
with the acts of the autonomous entity in extreme cases (for example when national 
security is threatened or if its powers have been exceeded).  
 
Among the main cited disadvantages of autonomy is that it might lead to 
disintegration of the state if every ethnic group were to demand it.  Autonomy might 
also might lead to discrimination against members of the majority ethnic group which 
find themselves a minority in the autonomous region. Autonomy might isolate the 
minority and alienate different groups, eventually leading to segregation. The example 
of the Faroe islands also shows that there is a danger that the state might feel less 
responsibility for the development of an autonomous entity (Suksi 1998: 12).  
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However, the arguments in favour are considerable. Autonomy may be a method of 
relieving tensions resulting from the heterogeneity of a state, especially in the case of 
a minority, an indigenous people or in cases where the right to self-determination is 
claimed.  Autonomy seeks to secure the rights of these groups.  It may also be used to 
address other aspects of heterogeneity, such as economic differences between regions.  
Autonomy has been recognised as an appropriate means to satisfy demands of 
minorities but has only been granted in exceptional cases.  Autonomy has not always 
been successful. It should therefore be kept in mind that each case is different and that 
autonomy is not a panacea. 
 
B. Issues to consider when establishing autonomy  
 
Many issues need to be addressed in the establishment of autonomy (Lapidoth 1997: 
179-198) such as:  
 
- Definition of the region or people; citizenship. The boundaries of the territory to 
benefit from autonomy should be drawn so that the number of persons constituting 
a "minority-within-the-minority" is minimised. In the case of insular regions, the 
geographic boundaries are already drawn. But what about those residing on the 
territory who do not share the ethnic, cultural, linguistic or other specific features 
of the group in question? Who makes the decision, the central government, the 
autonomous region or the individual? Provisions on the citizenship of residents of 
the autonomous area should be considered; the name of the autonomous region 
may be added to the passport.   
- Mode of establishment of autonomy. Autonomy may be established by 
international agreement or by the state itself by the introduction of relevant 
provisions in the Constitution or by the adoption of an organic or an ordinary law.  
- Institutions. Should the central government have the authority to dissolve the 
autonomous legislature, and if so, under what circumstances ? Should the laws 
passed by the autonomous entity be subject to subsequent approval by the central 
government and should the latter (e.g. president) have the right of veto over these 
laws? If so, then in which cases and who can arbitrate ? It should be decided 
whether the central government may have a say in the appointment of the head of 
the executive branch by the local legislature, or whether this position is to be filled 
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by the central government with the approval of the autonomous entity.  In the area 
of the judiciary, the centre may retain jurisdiction over the court system, or it may 
choose to also establish a system for the administration of justice in the 
autonomous entity.  Individuals, especially persons belonging to a minority-
within-the-minority, should have the possibility to have their grievances decided 
by a central court.  A joint organ may also be established to address matters that 
require co-ordination between the centre and the autonomous region.  
- Division of powers. Some powers will remain with the centre, others will be 
transferred to the autonomous authorities, while some might be exercised jointly 
or will be held by both but may be exercised by either centre or region 
independently (parallel powers). The autonomous authority usually enjoys powers 
in matters of culture, economics and social affairs.  But each of these areas must 
be examined to determine whether joint powers might not be necessary. Other 
areas which can be transferred or be the subject of joint powers are: water and 
energy; communication and transportation; protection of the environment. In most 
cases, external security and foreign relations remain with the centre, although in a 
few cases the autonomous government may enter into international agreements or 
become a member of an international organisation. In order to avoid disputes, the 
division of powers must be explained in as great a detail as possible. Financial 
matters (currency, foreign trade, banking, customs, taxation) must also be 
carefully discussed. In some cases, it is also possible to allow for a special 
autonomous legal system except in those areas retained by the centre. It should 
also be said who has the authority to resolve any question of residual powers 
(those not specifically mentioned).   
- Variables related to time. Should the autonomy be established in the whole area 
and in all spheres simultaneously, or should it be established in stages? Is 
autonomy intended to be a permanent solution or only provisional? 
- Power to amend the autonomy arrangement. Who should have this power and  
how should changes be introduced?  
- Supervision by the centre. The centre does not have a general power of control as 
in decentralisation but it may retain control through a veto on legislation or by 
requiring that laws passed by the autonomous legislature are subject to subsequent 
confirmation by the centre. Fiscal measures (periodic re-negotiation of resource  
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allocation) may also serve as an efficient means of control. Should the central 
organs have the power to dissolve the autonomous ones or to impose sanctions?  
- Preservation of the special character of the area. Should provisions be added to 
preserve the specific character of the autonomous region or should the door be left 
open for demographic change ? While measures to keep others out may enhance 
the preservation of the local group's culture and language, they may also create 
closed and self-centred societies. 
- Protection of human rights. Especially important as there is usually a minority 
within the minority.  Basic rights may be ensured by referring to fundamental 
human rights principles or to international standards applicable in the state.   
- Financing the autonomous entity. This question is of utmost importance and 
depends on the economic situation of the central authorities and the autonomous 
area. Granting the local authorities a share of the local taxes collected would be 
reasonable. Subsidies may be granted for a certain project or as a lump-sum to be 
used at the discretion of the autonomous authorities.  
- Participation in the public life of the state. Should the autonomous region take 
part in the public life of the state? If so, several mechanisms may be designed, e.g. 
full participation in the central government organs or partial representation.  
- Dispute settlement. Should eventual disputes be settled by diplomatic means 
(negotiation, mediation, enquiry, conciliation) or by a judicial procedure 
(arbitration or adjudication)? Lapidoth also imagines a two-tiered arrangement, 
starting with conciliation, with a right of appeal to adjudication. It should also be 
decided which organ is empowered to settle disputes (highest court of state, 
central body, joint organ or even an international body).   
 
C. Factors which might enhance the success of autonomy  
 
Based on a range of case studies, Lapidoth derives sixteen "ingredients" which 
enhance chances of success (Lapidoth 1997: 199-201).  These are indicated in Table 1 
in the annex section and will be further discussed in Section V. 
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III. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF CORSICA AND THE ÅLAND ISLANDS  
 
Corsica and the Åland Islands share one geographic feature from which several other 
characteristics derive: they are both insular regions, with specific problems linked to 
insularity such as seasonality of the economy, high cost of transports and a certain 
isolation due to remoteness from the mainland.  In both cases, territory is the primary 
reference point in determining identity, and one finds a dominant group with a strong 
linguistic identity, a "minority-within-the-minority" of the titular nation as well as 
smaller immigrant communities.  Another important feature is that both of these 
regions are situated within the framework of traditionally unitary states.  Beyond 
these common features, marked differences soon emerge when one examines the 
economic situation relative to the mainland, linguistic and other rights, and especially 
the institutional arrangements of the two regions, being the result of very different 
conflict regulation approaches adopted by Finland and France: autonomy in the case 
of Åland and advanced decentralisation in the case of Corsica. 
 
A. Corsica 
 
1. Geography, Demographics and the Economy 
Corsica, which is considered part of metropolitan France, is the third largest island in 
the Mediterranean in terms of surface area (8,680 km2) after Sicily and Sardinia.  
With a population of about 260,000, it is the least populated region of France (29 
inhabitants per square km against a national average of 104).  Corsica suffers from a 
demographic deficit due to decline from 1900 to 1955 during which it lost more than 
one third of its population— a trend which was only reversed in recent decades thanks 
to in-migration (10% immigrant workers and their families, mostly from North Africa 
but also Southern Europe).  There is an important "diaspora" of Corsicans on the 
mainland, estimated at about 300-500,000 (larger than the population of Corsica 
itself!).  Although Corsica is only about 170 km from Nice, it is a peripheral region 
(850 km from Paris), much closer to Sardinia (17 km) than to the coast of France.  
Costs of transportation take on particular significance, given that most transportation 
is maritime, with the largest share of products coming from France.  The environment 
and climate are major assets, especially for the tourist industry.    
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With an unemployment rate three or four percentage points above the national 
average,5 and a GDP per capita 30% below the national average, Corsica remains one 
of the most under-developed regions of France.  The Corsican economy has 
traditionally relied on agriculture and animal husbandry. Nowadays, however, 47.2% 
of jobs are in business and trade, 25.7% in the public sector, 11.6% in construction 
and engineering, and only 8.2% in agriculture and 7.3% in industry.6 The Corsican 
tourist industry, which was developed only at the end of the 1960s, generated 
significant resistance among those who feared that rapid and unplanned development 
of tourism would lead to the "balearisation" of the island and the loss of its specific 
identity.  It is true that the tourist industry is not well integrated into the rest of the 
economy, with most posts filled by persons from outside Corsica because of the lack 
of qualified local personnel.  The seasonality of the economy is evident here: 3,100 
full-time persons and 11,000 seasonal persons employed in tourism; 60% of tourists 
visit the island in July and August— a period during which the population of Corsica 
is doubled.  The whole Corsican economy relies heavily on tourism which accounts 
for 15% of GDP.  Thus, periods of unrest which affect tourism have a negative effect 
on the entire economy of the island.   
 
In order to compensate for handicaps linked to insularity, Corsica receives about 7 
billion French Francs annually from the EU and France together (1993 figure).  Since 
1988, Corsica had also been receiving EU structural funds.  In 1999, it was decided 
that Corsica would no longer be eligible as its GDP had marginally surpassed 75% of 
the national average.  Corsican politicians have advocated recognising the challenges 
faced by all insular regions, regardless of their income, and accompanying special 
measures.  
 
2. Language, Culture and Identity  
Corsican (Corsu), which belongs to the Tuscan group of Italian dialects, has been 
recognised by France as a separate language.  However, French is the only official 
language in Corsica, as on the rest of French territory.  According to a 1982 survey, 
96% of the island's inhabitants of Corsican origin (about 170,000 people, or 70% of 
                                               
5 As in the rest of France unemployment has dropped in Corsica, from 15% to an estimated 12% 
against 9.6% for France as a whole in June 2000. 
6 Atlas de la Corse (INSEE Corse, Cartographie et Décision, 1993), p. 14.  
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the total population) understand Corsican and 86% regularly speak the language.7   
Corsican is used on a voluntary basis by teachers at pre-primary level.  At the primary 
level, it can be taught three hours a week.  Various attempts have been made to teach 
some subjects through Corsican. At the secondary level, Corsican is offered as an 
optional subject (during lunch hours usually).  Adult courses in Corsican are widely 
available throughout the island, as well as in some cities on the French mainland.  As 
Corsican has no official status, its administrative and legal role is minimal.  It can be 
used occasionally in dealings with the administration and in court if the officials 
themselves speak the language; however, this is in no way a requirement nor even an 
asset when seeking public employment.  An active campaign by the Cultural Council 
of the Corsican Assembly has led to an increasing number of public signs in Corsican.   
 
3. Current Institutional Arrangements 
The current institutional arrangement of Corsica derives from the 1991 Special Statute  
(also known as the "Joxe Statute" named after its instigator, then Interior Minister 
Pierre Joxe) (Olivesi 1991).8 Corsica is a collectivité territoriale9— a special 
administrative entity combining elements from both the French Overseas Departments 
/Départements d'Outre-mer (DOM) and the Overseas Territories/Territoires d'Outre-
mer (TOM) (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995).  
 
The Corsican Assembly/ Assemblée de Corse10 has 51 members who are elected  for 
six years in a two-round proportional election.  In an attempt to make it more stable, a 
5% threshold was set for reaching the second round as well as a special bonus of seats 
to the electoral list with the most votes.  The Assembly has no legislative powers 
whatsoever; it functions as a deliberative body and may be consulted by the French 
                                               
7 European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (http://www.eblul.org/State/france.htm#Corsican). 
8 Law no 91-428 of 13 May 1991, "Statut de la collectivité territoriale de Corse".  
9 This status, based on articles 72 and 34 of the 1958 French Constitution, was created by the French 
Parliament for Mayotte when, in a referendum on 11 April 1976, it rejected both independence and 
TOM status.  The other collectivité territoriale in France is St. Pierre-et-Miquelon (established on 11 
June 1985). 
10 Elections to the Corsican Assembly are organised at the same time as in the other regions of France.  
A minimum of 5% of votes is needed to make it to the second round. The list with the most votes gets a 
“bonus” of 3 seats. The results of the 1998 regional elections were cancelled and new elections were 
called in 1999 following a complaint filed by Dr. Edmond Simeoni (Unione di u Populu Corsu— UPC). 
Even though the left managed to present a unified front in Corsica in the 1998 and 1999 elections as the 
"Gauche plurielle", it has not managed to unseat the right in its leading position in the Corsican 
Assembly and the Executive Council. 
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Prime Minister on draft laws or decrees on matters which directly affect the island.  
Unlike in the TOM, consultation of the Corsican Assembly is not obligatory. The 
Executive Council / Conseil exécutif is composed of seven "ministers" selected from 
the Assembly (and who must therefore resign from it); it is headed by a "president".  
The consultative Economic, Social and Cultural Council / Conseil économique, social 
et culturel (CESC) is tasked with assisting in setting Corsica's own medium-term 
objectives for economic, social and cultural development as well as the means needed 
for reaching these objectives ("Plan de développement de la Corse").  One such 
means is the arrangement between the State and the region ("Contrat de Plan - Etat 
Collectivité territoriale").   
 
The 1991 statute conferred new powers in the field of education, specifically in 
research and training.  The Corsican Assembly was also tasked with developing a plan 
for the teaching of Corsican language and culture (as an optional subject).  These new 
powers were the result of proposals by the Executive Council after consultation with 
the CESC and the University of Corsica at Corte.  Corsica is also fully responsible 
now for managing transportation between the island and the continent. The 1991 
Statute also sought to give the new institutions the financial means to carry out their 
job properly in connection with the additional transfer of powers (termed "dotation de 
continuité territoriale"). 
 
In addition to the regional structures, Corsica is divided into two departments/ 
départements: Haute-Corse (North Corsica) and Corse-du-Sud (South Corsica)— each 
with its own elected assembly or General Council / Conseil général.  The division of 
competencies between the region and the departments is not always clear, leading to 
overlapping and inefficiency; it also makes Corsica an over-administrated region with 
the highest number of elected officials per capita in France.  
 
4. Corsica and Europe 
Corsicans voted against the EU Treaty in the referendum of 20 September 1992 
(Olivesi 1995). This was a surprising result because this was a region which, along 
with the DOM, was the beneficiary of special EU funding.  Furthermore, other French 
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regions with a strong identity had voted in favour (e.g. Alsace and Brittany voted yes, 
with 65.58% and 59.85% respectively), in line with a general phenomenon of pro-EU 
sentiment from regions which see it as an opportunity to by-pass the national capitals. 
This result could have been a side-effect of the divisions generated by the new 1991 
statute (see below).  Corsica is involved in several international co-operation networks 
linking island regions such as IMEDOC11 (Iles de la Méditerranée occidentale/ 
Islands of the Western Mediterranean). Corsica does not currently enjoy 
representation at the European Parliament as Jean Baggioni (RPR), also President of 
the Executive Council of Corsica, was not re-elected.  
 
B. The Åland Islands (Eriksson and Johansson 1997) 
 
1. Geography, Demographics and the Economy 
An autonomous province of Finland, the Åland Islands are located in the Baltic Sea, 
at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia near the Swedish coast.  Because of this 
strategic location of great importance to Finland, Sweden and Russia, the Åland 
Islands were demilitarised in 1856; this was later confirmed by an international 
convention drawn up by the League of Nations in 1921.  An archipelago of more than 
6,500 islands and skerries, with only 65 of them inhabited, the Åland Islands occupy a 
land area of 1,552 km2.  Of the population of 25,000, 40% live in the only town, 
Mariehamn.  The population today is as high as it has ever been.  
 
Being a small community, Åland is greatly dependent on exchanges of goods and 
services with surrounding regions.  In contrast to Corsica, the GDP per capita for 
Åland is higher than the national average, although the level of income does not 
exceed the Finnish average.  The Åland Islands have succeeded in capitalising upon 
the advantages of insularity, with shipping as the main source of income, followed by 
agriculture and fishing.  Their location between two economic centres, southern 
Finland and the Stockholm region, presents great advantages for the shipping 
industry; but is also means that they are greatly dependent on the fluctuations of these 
markets.  Tourism has been expanding since the 1960s so that today services, 
                                               
11 The objective of IMEDOC, which also includes the Balearic Islands and Sardinia, is to give a 
stronger voice to these island regions within the EU by lobbying for a recognition of the insular 
dimension in its policies. The IMEDOC protocol was adopted in Palma (Mallorca) on 9 May 1995. 
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including tourism, account for over 30% of jobs.  Ferry services play a particularly 
important role in supporting tourism.  The labour market in Åland is seasonal due to 
the large number of tourists in the summer.  During the peak period, service industries 
are dependent upon labour from other places and unemployment is low.  However, 
because of the restructuring of the shipping industry in the 1990s, unemployment has 
become a concern.  It is now on the decrease since a peak in 1994 at nearly 9% (a 
similar trend was observed in Finland as a whole),  averaging only about 3% in 1998 
(compared to 11.4 % for the rest of Finland in 1998).  As in Corsica, emigration has 
been an alternative to unemployment, with mostly young and well-educated people 
tending to move to Sweden when economic conditions worsen.  
 
2. Language, Culture and Identity  
The Åland Islands are 94% Swedish-speaking and form a unilingually Swedish-
speaking province of Finland which recognises two official languages, Finnish and 
Swedish.  The Åland Islands' Swedish language and traditions stem from the 650 
years of Swedish rule and is strongly protected by the provisions in the Autonomy 
Act.  Swedish is the only official language in use and all State officials must know 
Swedish.  Official letters and other documents sent to Åland by the Finnish State must 
also be in Swedish.  Åland has extensive autonomy in the field of education.  All 
teaching in schools receiving public support is in Swedish.  While English is a 
compulsory subject, Finnish is optional only.  Since opportunities for tertiary 
education are limited, most of those who aim at a university degree leave to study in 
Sweden or Finland and are less likely to return afterwards.   
 
The inhabitants of Åland have a strong sense of identity and, when asked whether 
they consider themselves Swedish or Finnish, they will reply that they feel like 
"Ålanders".  Whether or not they constitute a separate minority from the rest of the 
Swedish-speakers in Finland12 is a subject to debate.  What is certain, however, is that 
                                               
12 The Swedish-speaking community of Finland amounts to 295,000 persons or 5.8% of the population.    
Although they are a minority numerically, legally they are not considered as such.  Linguistic rights are 
guaranteed in section 17 of the Finnish Constitution (for a text of the new 1999 Constitution which 
entered into force on 1 March 2000 (see http://www.vn.fi/vn/english/index.htm) and by the 1922 
Language Act.  The majority of Swedish-speakers in Finland live in bilingual municipalities but there 
are also monolingual Swedish municipalities in Ostrobothnia and in the southwest near Åbo/Turku.  A 
municipality is bilingual when there are at least 8% or 3,000 Swedish-speaking persons.  
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because of their isolation, a strong Ålandic identity developed which distinguished 
them from the Swedish-speaking population of the mainland which, in general, 
strongly identifies itself with Finland (Suksi 1996: 21-22).  With time, the Ålandic 
identity has evolved and today many Ålanders describe themselves as Europeans, 
Nordic, Finlanders and Ålanders.  Most important in protecting the specific identity of 
the Islands is the concept of regional citizenship.  Indeed, it is necessary to possess 
Åland regional citizenship in order to vote and to stand for office in the Åland 
Legislative Assembly; to own and hold real estate; and in order to operate a business.  
In order to acquire regional citizenship, one must be a Finnish citizen, have resided in 
the Åland Islands for five years and demonstrate a satisfactory knowledge of Swedish.  
A child may also acquire regional citizenship at birth if one parent already possesses 
it.  Regional citizenship may be withdrawn if a person has resided outside of Åland 
for more than five years.  Åland has national symbols such as its own flag (since 
1954) and its own postage stamps.  The passports of these "Åland citizens" bear the 
mention "Åland". 
 
There are about 1,100 Finnish-speakers on Åland (5% of the population). Although 
there are certain concessions to Finnish speakers (Finnish may be used when 
appearing in a court of law or in communication with other State officials in Åland; 
exceptions may also be made to allow citizens of Finland or of other Nordic countries 
to vote in municipal elections), questions have been raised regarding whether Finland 
has violated international human rights conventions because of Åland's provisions 
related to language and education which severely limit the rights of the Finnish-
speakers (Horn 1997).  According to one expert (Suksi 1996: 29-30), the Åland 
provisions may constitute a violation of the 1960 UNESCO Convention against 
discrimination in education. 
 
3. Institutional Arrangements and Division of Powers 
The current institutions and their powers derive from the Act on the Autonomy of 
Åland of 16 August 1991/1144, which came into force on 1 January 1993.13  This is 
the third autonomy agreement.  The Åland Islands have a locally elected legislative 
                                               
13 Act on the Autonomy of Åland, 16 August 1991/1144 (Unofficial English translation. Original text 
published in Swedish and Finnish) (Hannum 1993: 117-140).  
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assembly (Lagting), a provincial government (Landskapsstyrelse), as well as a 
Governor who is the direct representative of the Finnish Government.  He is 
appointed by the Finnish Government after agreement with the speaker of the Lagting 
(sections 4, 52-54 of the Autonomy Act). 
 
The Lagting (sections 3, 13-15), consisting of 30 members, is elected every four years 
by means of proportional ballot.  Only persons with regional citizenship may vote or 
stand for election. The Åland Landskapsstyrelse may consist of five to seven 
members, is appointed by the Lagting and must be the result of as broad a majority as 
possible— a minority government cannot be appointed.  The chair of the Government 
is called the Lantråd.  The Government is assisted by an administration consisting of 
a central board and six departments.  It exercises its administrative authority in all 
spheres which under the Autonomy Act devolve upon the Åland authorities.   
 
Legislative as well as administrative authority is divided between the centre and the 
province but, despite clarifications in the 1991 Autonomy Act, the division is not 
always clear.  The Lagting has legislative competencies in the following spheres, inter 
alia (sections 17-18): education, culture, and preservation of ancient monuments; 
health and medical services; social welfare; promotion of industry; internal 
communications; housing, tenancy and rent regulation, lease of land; municipal 
administration; additional tax on income; public order and security; the postal service, 
radio and television; farming and forestry, agriculture and fishing; protection of the 
environment; mining rights (Palmgren 1997: 86-88).  The spheres of competence 
which the Finnish authorities have retained are: foreign affairs, civil and penal law, 
courts of justice, customs and monetary services.  The division of powers is actually 
quite flexible as some powers may be transferred from the State to the province or 
vice-versa.  For example, Finland and Åland may agree to transfer to Åland some 
spheres of power which would normally lie within the competence of the State, e.g. 
population registers, trade and shipping registers, pensions and other social insurance, 
banking and credit services; there may also be an agreement on transfer of 
administrative powers from the State to a provincial officer and vice-versa (Lapidoth 
1997: 73).  In some instances, the Åland Government may hear appeals against 
administrative decisions by the Finnish State (section 25).  Even in the matters 
reserved for the State, Åland’s interests are represented. This is guaranteed by a 
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representative for the Islands, elected to the Finnish Parliament.  Furthermore, the 
provincial authorities may submit initiatives on matters within the legislative or 
administrative power of the State to the Finnish Government which must then present 
them to the Finnish Parliament for consideration (section 22). 
 
The Lagting is subject to clear though limited legislative supervision from the centre 
(sections 19-20).  All laws which it passes must be submitted to the President of 
Finland for approval within four months, in order not to drag the process indefinitely.  
He may impose his veto in two cases only: if the Lagting has exceeded its legislative 
competence or if the law affects the external or internal security of the country.  In 
order to minimise the number of such occurrences, before a draft law is presented to 
the President, it must be presented to the Åland Delegation (see below) which gives 
its opinion on the matter (section 19).   It may also be dissolved by the President, after 
consultation with the speaker of the Lagting.  
 
The 1991 Act considerably expanded the economic autonomy of the province and 
sought to regulate economic relations with the State.  Besides passing laws, the main 
duty of the Lagting is to adopt the budget of Åland.  The Finnish State collects taxes, 
customs and duty charges in Åland, as in the rest of Finland; in return, Åland is 
compensated by an allocation of 0.45% of the State budget, not including state loans.  
This lump sum is placed at the disposal of the Lagting to manage affairs which would 
otherwise be administered by State authorities.  This 'equalisation' sum is "to cover 
the costs of autonomy" (section 45).  There is also a provision for tax retribution 
(section 49) which allows Åland to receive a share of the gains if income and property 
tax levied in the province exceeds 0.5% of the corresponding tax in the entire country.  
 
Finally, the Åland Delegation is a joint organ of Åland and the Finnish State.  Chaired 
by the Governor, it consists of two legal experts appointed by Finland and two 
appointed by the Lagting (sections 5, 55-57).  Its duties are to carry out 'equalisation', 
seek fiscal adjustments (also called tax retribution). Occasional financial 
arrangements made by the Åland Delegation require the President’s approval.  The 
expenses of the Åland Delegation are shared by Åland and the Finnish State. 
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4. An International Voice in Europe  
Although Finland is responsible for foreign affairs, Åland enjoys a certain 
international voice.  Since 1970, it has had its own representation in the Nordic 
Council and the Landskapsstyrelse participates in the work of the Nordic Council of 
Ministers. 14  Åland also has a representative in the Finnish Permanent Mission to the 
EU in Brussels, acting not as an ambassador but as a contact link.  Also, one of 
Finland's representatives in the EU Committee of the Regions is from Åland.   
 
According to the provisions concerning international treaties in the Autonomy Act, 
the Government of Åland may propose negotiations on a treaty with a foreign state.  
Furthermore, the Åland Government must be informed of negotiations on a treaty 
with a foreign state if the matter is subject to its competence and it may even 
participate in the negotiations (section 58).  If Finland contracts an international treaty 
which contains a provision coming under the sphere of competence of Åland, then the 
consent of the Lagting is required for the treaty to apply to Åland as well (section 59).  
Thus, because part of the legislative power of the Finnish State and of Åland had to be 
transferred to EU institutions, the consent of Åland had to be obtained through 
referendum before Finland joined the European Union in 1995.  The 1991 Autonomy 
Act was also amended to include a new chapter on the participation of Åland in EU 
matters. Certain exemptions were decided and were included in a separate protocol to 
the accession treaty (Suksi 1996: 32-36).15  
 
 
                                               
14 The members of the Nordic Council are: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland as well as 
Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands.  
15 Åland stands outside the EU tax union and has retained the limitations on ownership of land and 
operation of business. 
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IV. ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT AND STATE RESPONSES 
 
This section seeks to explain the origins of the Åland crisis and the emergence of the 
"Corsican Question" and to evaluate state responses by Finland and France 
respectively.  A separate section shall be devoted to what can be considered the most 
significant effort to date of the French Government to settle the conflict in Corsica, 
together with elected representatives of the Corsican population, and to design 
genuine remedies in the form of autonomy: the "Matignon Process" (December 1999 
to July 2000) which resulted in a set of compromise proposals by the French 
Government on 20 July.  
 
A. The Åland Islands 
 
1. The Åland Crisis (1920-1922)  
Due to their strategic location in the Baltic Sea, the Åland Islands have been the 
subject of considerable military interest; their strategic importance has also had a 
significant impact on their history.  After a long period of Swedish rule (1157-1809), 
the Åland Islands were lost to Russia along with Finland.  Finland, including the 
Åland Islands, became an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire and 
the Constitution of Sweden continued to be in force during the period of Russian rule 
(1809-1917).  Åland was heavily fortified by Russia during 1836-1853.  During the 
Crimean War, the fortifications were destroyed by the French and British and Åland 
was "offered" to Sweden; for fear of Russia and from the desire to preserve its 
neutrality, this offer was declined by Sweden but Russia was compelled to sign a 
treaty on the demilitarisation of the Islands at the Peace of Paris in 1856.   
 
Defensive fortifications did not prevent Åland from being occupied during the First 
World War, first by Sweden and then by Germany.  During the chaos of the collapse 
of the Russian Empire in 1917, a movement took shape in the Åland Islands seeking 
reunification with motherland Sweden fear of losing their language and cultural in the 
case of an independent Finnish state.  Sweden, which saw foreign rule of the islands 
as a security threat, reacted supportively. Two unofficial petitions organised by the 
Ålanders (in December 1917 when Finland declared independence and again in June 
1919) yielded an overwhelming majority in favour of reunion (Suksi 1996: 23-24). 
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The Åland dispute was first referred to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 by 
Sweden, hoping for a similar settlement as with the Schleswig Question.  This did not 
succeed and the case was raised at the Council of the League of Nations on 11 July 
1920 by Great Britain (a party to the 1856 demilitarisation treaty).  Preferring to grant 
some rights rather than risk losing the Islands entirely, Finland proposed the Act on 
Self-Government of 6 May 1920.  These original offers of autonomy were rejected by 
the Åland Islands which invoked the principle of self-determination (Cassese 1995: 
27-33).   Finland tried, without success, to have the case withdrawn from the agenda 
of the Council, maintaining that it was an internal dispute.  Sweden favoured an 
official plebiscite in Åland which it knew would turn out in favour of reunification.  
The Council of the League of Nations recognised that the Åland Islands were a matter 
of international concern but it rejected Åland's claims to self-determination because of 
its opinion that minority groups did not have the right under international law to 
demand to be separated from their state.  While Finland's sovereignty over the Islands 
was recognised, the Council recommended that Finland provide additional guarantees 
for the protection of the Swedish character of the Islands.  Finland thus undertook a 
series of commitments concerning the language of instruction in schools, the 
limitation of the sale of land to persons not domiciled in the Islands, financial matters, 
and a supervisory function for the Council of the League of Nations.  These 
guarantees, which were reached by agreement between Sweden and Finland and were 
approved by the Council of the League of Nations on 27 June 1921, were 
incorporated into the Finnish legal system by the 1922 Åland Guarantee Act.16  
 
2. The Development of Åland's Autonomy Regime 
While the Ålanders were disappointed by the outcome and Finland was not happy 
about outside intervention, the first twenty years of autonomy were marked by the 
correct and law-abiding if not always enthusiastic attitude of the Finnish Government. 
                                               
16The Åland Islands Agreement of 27 June 1921 (Hannum 1993: 141-143) is exceptional in many 
respects.  It was signed by neither Sweden nor Finland, it does not appear in the treaty series of the 
League of Nations nor in the official Finnish or Swedish treaty series.  The procedure of incorporation 
into Finnish law was also exceptional as, rather than being reprinted in the official treaty series, it was 
incorporated into Finnish legislation by a new act (that of 11 August 1922).  Modeen (1991: 160-163) 
postulates two reasons: (1) the agreement concerned only the Åland Islands and since Finland 
maintained her sovereignty and Sweden did not obtain any rights, Sweden did not find it necessary to 
mention the agreement; (2) Finland did not wish to emphasise Sweden’s role as a party to the 
agreement and preferred to see it only as a League of Nations instrument; also, Finland’s obligations 
would be more readily accepted by domestic opinion than if Sweden had been mentioned.    
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The autonomy of Åland has been expanded through two major revisions to the 
autonomy act in 1951 and in 1991.  The first revision was initiated after the Second 
World War, when a new generation of politicians came to power.  A regional 
movement also developed in Åland during the years 1950-1975.  National symbols 
were created (the Åland flag, stamps and a national museum).  The 1951 Autonomy 
Act introduced the specific right of domicile (or "regional citizenship"), although 
elements of it already existed in the previous act.  In the Autonomy Act of 16 August 
1991, which entered into force on 1 January 1993, satisfactory knowledge of Swedish 
as a requirement for regional citizenship was added.  The other aims of the 1991 
revision, enacted with the mutual consent of both the Finnish government and the 
Åland legislative assembly, was to define more clearly the legislative competencies of 
the state and of the provincial authorities; to transfer additional areas of competence 
to Åland and to provide for the later transfer of increased authority in other areas; and 
to expand autonomy in the economic sphere (Hannum 1993: 116).      
 
3. Evaluation of the Success of Conflict Regulation 
Conflict regulation through the establishment of autonomy for the Åland Islands in 
1920-22 and its further development can be judged as successful from several aspects. 
 
a. Containment of the Conflict  
That the supervision mechanisms by the League of Nations and the Permanent Court 
of International Justice established in the 1922 Act never had to be used is a sign that 
a reasonably good atmosphere prevailed in that period.17  Today, the attitude of most 
Ålanders towards autonomy is positive and both the Finnish and the Åland 
governments present Åland as one of Finland's strategies for safeguarding the rights 
of minorities in Finland.  The region has always been very peaceful, although calls for 
independence were heard for the first time in the political debate during the fall 1999 
election campaign.  Still, the prospects of a separatist movement or calls for a 
referendum on independence are highly unlikely in the near future.   
 
 
                                               
17 This mechanism disappeared with the end of the League of Nations and was not replaced in the 1951 
Act as the United Nations did not wish to take on a supervisory role. 
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b. Preservation and Promotion of the Minority Identity 
The combination of wide-ranging provisions in the spheres of language and education 
as well as regional citizenship aiming at the protection of the specificity of Åland has 
contributed to allaying fears that the language and identity of Ålanders would be lost 
through eventual assimilatory state policies or demographic and migration processes.  
Although the Swedish nature of the Islands would have probably survived unharmed 
until the 1940s, it would have come under considerable ‘threat’ due to the population 
movements after the Second World War, had it not been for the far-ranging provisions 
of the autonomy act (Modeen 1991: 167). 
 
c. Political and Institutional Stability 
The political and institutional situation has been stable, and by clarifying division of 
competencies and increasing economic autonomy, the effectiveness of the institutions 
has been enhanced.  This does not mean that there are not lively and sometimes 
heated political debates in Åland as elsewhere.     
 
B. Corsica 
 
1. What is the “Corsican Question”?  
Relations between the French State and Corsica have to this date been characterised 
by misunderstanding and mistrust based on misperceptions concerning the "Corsican 
Question" (Briquet 1997; 1998) which is often reduced to a problem of violence.  
Terrorist actions receive a lot of press in Paris.  Thus, the actions of a minority of 
Corsicans are seen as an expression of the will of the majority, as exemplified by a 
statement in 1996 by former Prime Minister Raymond Barre: if Corsicans want to be 
independent, then let them! (“S’ils veulent l’indépendance, qu’ils la prennent!”). 
However, this is not the main demand of Corsicans:  only about 6-7% of the Corsican 
population favour independence,18 while the share in the population of France as a 
                                               
18 According to an opinion poll by the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur on 4 April 1996, 10% of 
Corsicans and 41% of nationalists sympathisers polled were in favour of independence. An opinion 
poll by another weekly, L'Evènement du Jeudi, taken a few days after the murder of the Prefect in 
February 1998, showed 6% of Corsicans in favour of independence, compared to 7% in October 1996.  
The separatist nationalists of Corsica Nazione obtained 16.8% in the second round of the 1999 regional 
elections; however, this included autonomist and  other votes which went to Corsica Nazione because 
they were the only party to make it past the 5% threshold for the 2nd round.  
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whole is as high as 40%, reflecting perhaps a certain lassitude regarding the fate of 
this at times loved, at times scorned island seen by many in France as a guzzler of 
state funds.  The Corsican Question is also perceived as a problem of political 
corruption and nationalist straying from the original ideals towards Mafia-style 
racketeering ("dérive mafieuse").  
  
Corsica's problems have often been attributed to its specific social and cultural 
characteristics.  In Corsica itself, these problems are seen as a consequence of the 
refusal of the French State to take the island's specificity into account.  But the 
Corsican Question is also a product of its specific history or, more exactly, a product 
of the particular relations between Corsica and the French State.  Several features will 
be highlighted (Briquet 1998): 
 
- major reorganisation of the agricultural sector, without bringing any benefits to 
the local population (1957 Programme d'Action régionale de la Corse) but rather 
to the settlers from Algeria after 1962. 
- A state policy of development of tourism perceived as a violation of the territory 
and as colonial exploitation. 
- An economy highly subsidised by the French State; the public sector is the main 
source of employment.  This is a contradictory model: state intervention ensures 
the modernisation of society but this in turn leads to increasing expectations which 
the state cannot fulfil.  It also leads to an increasing desire to live and work in 
Corsica rather than exodus and therefore to demands for better educational 
opportunities in Corsica.  
- Corsican nationalism is built on public dissatisfaction and has succeeded in 
mobilising society and in uniting a variety of interests.  Protest has become a valid 
political strategy. Local political actors have fought militant nationalism because 
it attacks the power of the (political) clans.  In contrast to other regions of Europe, 
the nationalist movement has not been a part of official political life. 
- Successive statutes have reinforced the power of the local élite and their control 
over resources. 
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2. Emergence of the "Corsican Question" and State Responses 19 
(See Annexes 2 & 3 for an overview of political parties in Corsica and a genealogy of 
Corsican nationalist movements and clandestine groups).  
 
a. Historical Background 
Due to the island's strategic position in the Western Mediterranean, Corsican history 
has been a tumultuous succession of domination by foreign peoples (Romans, Pisans, 
Genoese and even the French) and rebellions.  Short, though important, was the 
period of virtual independence during the 18th century under Pasquale Paoli (1755-
1769) which was achieved by rebellion against repressive Genoese rule.  Unable to 
put down the rebellion, the Genoese sold the island to France in 1768 (just in time for 
Napoleon Buonaparte to be born a French citizen).  After the 1789 French Revolution, 
the Corsicans rebelled again, holding a plebiscite in 1794 calling for union with Great 
Britain.  Lost during the Napoleonic Wars to Britain, it was regained by France at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815.  Another important period in Corsica's history was the 
uprising against the Italian occupation forces in 1943.  Expecting independence, the 
Corsicans found themselves again under French rule. 
 
Four historical phases of political and identity claims in Corsica can be distinguished, 
according to Corsican historian Ettori (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995: 121): 
i. 1869-1896: a period marked by competition between French and Italian influences 
 won by the former; slow integration into the French polity.  
ii. 1896-1940: revival of cultural opposition and appearance in 1896 of the first 
 review in the Corsican language; this was followed by political revival with the 
 emergence in 1922 of the Partitu Corsu d'Azione (which becomes the Partitu 
Corsu Autonomistu in 1927).  It did not survive the Second World War due to 
fascist inclinations during occupation by Mussolini (1940-1943).  
iii. 1940-1965: economic, demographic and cultural decline. The central government 
tried to stem the massive post-war exodus with the Plan d'Action Régional in 1957, 
again reactivated in 1958 as a means of facilitating the relocation of 17,000 "pied 
noir" settlers from Algeria following independence in 1962. The settlers were given 
                                               
19 Eric Conan, “Voyage dans la tête des Corses,” L’Express, 28 January 1999; Michel Labro, 
“Comment on en est arrivé  là,” L‘Express, 12 February 1998. 
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preferential treatment for obtaining land in the east (Plaine orientale), much to the 
annoyance of local Corsicans.  
iv. "Final phase" (late 1960s until today): marked by the attempt of various 
movements to force the French government to recognise the specificity of the island 
rather than trying to forcibly assimilate it.  
 
b. The Failure of Corsican Regionalism and the Emergence of Corsican Nationalism 
According to some interpretations, the French Government contributed to the rise of 
Corsican nationalism by refusing to search for the roots of the crisis and to grant 
French regions more powers in the early 1970s when regionalist movements were 
sweeping Europe.  The origins of the Corsican nationalist movement can also be 
traced to the failure of the formation of regionalist parties in Corsica (Olivesi 1998).  
One of the important moments in the history of the nationalist movement was the 
publication in 1974 of a document called "Autonomia" by the ARC ("Action 
régionaliste corse", later renamed "Action pour la renaissance de la Corse") led by 
the charismatic Edmond Simeoni.  From that moment on, demands for a special status 
and the constitutional recognition of the Corsican people were closely linked.  The 
turning point occurred on 21 August 1975, when the peaceful occupation of a wine 
cellar of a “pied noir” settler in Aléria by ARC militants turned into tragedy as the 
cellar was stormed by the gendarmes and two of them were killed.  One year later, on 
5 May 1976, the separatist militant FLNC (Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a 
Corsica / Corsican National Liberation Front) was born.  Its name was inspired by the 
anti-colonial liberation front in Algeria.  The appearance of the FLNC marked the 
beginning of a vicious cycle of terrorist violence and state repression.  It also 
indicated a major split in the nationalist movement between two general tendencies: 
"separatist nationalists" who sought independence from France, and "autonomist 
nationalists" who favoured a form of autonomy for Corsica within the framework of 
the French State.  Although these two tendencies shared a number of common 
positions, for example they both recognised the existence of a separate "Corsican 
people", they differed substantially on the methods to be used.  Autonomists have 
now largely abandoned the use of violence, whereas separatist nationalists 
systematically resort to it.  From then on, but especially over the last decade, the 
nationalist movement has become crippled by fragmentation and infighting.  
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c. Institutional Solutions: Decentralisation in 1982 and the 1991 Special Statute 
The socialist victory in 1981 marked a new phase of in the French Government's 
policy towards Corsica, in strong opposition to the heavy-handed approaches of 
previous governments.  In keeping with a promise made to Corsicans in Ajaccio by 
future President François Mitterrand, Corsica received a special statute on 2 March 
1982.20  Although Interior Minister Gaston Deferre had announced that it would be 
similar to those of Sicily and Sardinia, the final result was much less significant in the 
form of a simple law.  The attenuation of the statute was also due to pressure from one 
of the political clans in Corsica, the left-wing MRG (Mouvement des Radicaux de 
gauche).21 Although the term "peuple corse" (Corsican people) had to be stricken 
from the final text (it was deemed in contradiction to the principle of indivisibility of 
the French Republic), for the first time the specificity of Corsica as well as its cultural 
identity, language and traditions were accepted.  The measures introduced by the 1982 
law were dissipated by decentralisation in the whole of France one year later, as well 
as by developments in the French overseas territories.22 Corsica's institutions were 
similar to those given to other regions with the exception that Corsica's elected body 
was called Assemblée de Corse / Corsican Assembly rather than conseil régional / 
regional council; also, two consultative councils on economic, social and cultural 
matters were established.  The Corsican Assembly had no legislative powers and 
could only solicit the Prime Minister who was not obliged to follow the advice of the 
Assembly (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995: 124).23  The powers of the Corsican 
Assembly were more extensive in areas relevant to the specific needs of the island: 
culture, transport, planning, and education.  A special feature of the 1982 Statute was 
that the Assembly had a unique capacity to communicate directly with the 
Government (art. 27) or to be consulted by it on all matters concerning Corsica.  It 
                                               
20 Law no. 82-214 of 2 March 1982 "Statut de la Collectivité territoriale de Corse", Journal officiel de 
la République française, 3 March 1982).  
21 This is the party of former minister Emile Zuccarelli who continues to this day to strongly oppose 
autonomy for Corsica.  Another MRG member and major advocate of autonomy is Paul Giacobbi, 
president of the North Corsica Council and Deputy at the Corsican Assembly.  
22 A circular from the Ministry of the Interior and of Decentralisation dated 20 February 1986 stated 
that "all regions, including Ile-de-France, Corsica and those overseas, are from now on regulated by the 
law of 2 March 1982 and the modified law of 5 July 1972"; Corsica thus became one of the 26 French 
regions (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995: 124). 
23 The Government did accept some recommendations on non-controversial issues related to the 
environment but not in linguistic or educational matters. 
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should be noted that whereas in the case of Corsica this right was limited to 
consultation, the TOM had the right to abrogate a law which affected them.  
In 1990, renewed debates over Corsica led to a new attempt to lay the institutional 
foundations for the development of Corsica while respecting its special identity 
(Olivesi 1991).  On 29 September 1988, less than four months after the re-election of 
Mitterrand, an inter-ministerial committee was set up by Interior Minister Pierre Joxe 
with the task of formulating an approach.  The aim of the reform was to enhance the 
effectiveness of the regional institutions and to give Corsicans "greater control over 
their destiny".  One of the promises which Joxe made was to incorporate the 
resolution of the Corsican Assembly from 13 October 1988 which called for the 
recognition of the peuple corse.  The new statute adopted by the French Parliament on 
12 April 1991 (despite the opposition of almost all opposition deputies) was an 
advanced form of decentralisation; still, it was original in many respects.  The law of 
13 May 1991 reinforced the Corsican region or collectivité territoriale de Corse24 and 
gave it specific institutions different from those of other French regions.  The 1991 
law also sought to re-establish the foundations of democracy by dissolving the 
electoral lists in an attempt to eradicate electoral fraud and non-existent voters.25  
What caused the greatest controversy was article 1 of the law which explicitly 
referred to the "peuple corse".26 Even though the term was not used in isolation but as 
"le peuple corse, composante du peuple français" (which the nationalists, on the other 
hand, found too weak), the French Constitutional Council27 ruled that it was contrary 
to the Constitution and had to be cancelled.28  The 1991 Statute was thereby deprived 
                                               
24 See section III.A.3 on Current Institutional Arrangements and footnote 9. 
25 This caused the number of registered voters to drop from 200,000 to 158,000.  
26 Article 1 read: "The French Republic guarantees to the historic and cultural community constituted 
by the Corsican people, constituents of the French people, the right to preserve its cultural identity and 
to defend its specific economic and social interests.  These rights related to insularity are to be 
exercised with respect for national unity, within the framework of the Constitution, of the laws of the 
Republic, and of this present statute" (author's translation).      
27 The French Constitutional Council / Conseil constitutionnel is a permanent consultative court (but 
not a supreme judiciary court) whose powers can be divided into two categories: judicial authority, 
covering disputes in the area of electoral and referendum disputes for example; and consultative 
powers concerning the conformity of a draft law with the French Constitution. In this latter case, it 
gives its opinion when consulted by the French President; its decision is binding and no appeal may be 
made. Decisions may lead to total or partial censure of a law but not its annulment as decisions are 
handed down before promulgation or ratification. For more, see: http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/anglais/ang4.htm). 
28 The Constitutional Council ruled on 9 May 1991 that this article was contrary to the preamble and 
article 2 of the French Constitution according to which the French People and the French Republic are 
indivisible, and also contrary to article 3 which designates the French people as the holder of national 
sovereignty (see Constitutional Council Decision no. 91-290 of 9 May 1991 at: http://www.conseil-
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of its very political foundations (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995: 126).  One may 
also note that the 1991 Statute sought to justify the special measures devised for 
Corsica by relating them to insularity, thereby aiming to avoid similar claims in other 
French regions with a strong identity.  
 
d. A Government Policy of Divide and Conquer 
The impact of the 1982 reforms was significant for the nationalists who obtained 
political recognition and were able to participate in regional elections to the newly 
created Corsican Assembly.29  With 11-21% percent of the votes in the period 1982-
1993, the nationalist movement enjoyed a certain political influence in the Corsican 
Assembly. Although local politicians were markedly hostile to the nationalist 
discourse, elements of this discourse (e.g. the need to protect the specific Corsican 
identity, language and culture, and demands that the State ensure the development of 
the island) soon became part of the mainstream political discourse.  Despite a relative 
electoral success, by the early 1980s the clandestine dimension of the nationalist 
movement had grown beyond control, factions of which gave in to the temptations of 
illegal business. A revolutionary tax was imposed and anyone who refused to pay it 
risked losing his life.30 In 1990, a major split occurred in the FLNC,31 yielding two 
groups who carved up their spheres of influence: the FLNC-Canal historique / historic 
channel (and its political front A Cuncolta Naziunalista) and the FLNC-Canal 
habituel / "usual" channel (with the MPA— Mouvement pour l’autodétermination— as 
its political front).  This split was a reflection of the conflict between "political 
nationalists" and "militant nationalists".  The more moderate MPA was selected by 
Socialist Interior Minister Joxe for discreet negotiations. By this time, the division 
                                                                                                                                      
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1991/91290dc.htm). However, it also ruled that to recognise the specificity 
of Corsica was not in violation of the constitutionally recognised principle of equality. For an official 
English translation of the French Constitution of 1958 see: www.elysee.fr/ang. The French original is 
at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/frame_constitution.htm. 
29 The autonomist UPC headed by Edmond Simeoni obtained 11% of the votes (7 seats) in 1982 but 
only 3 seats in 1984 as there was also a separatist nationalist list which obtained 3 seats as well. A joint 
list in 1986 resulted in 6 seats only. In 1992 and thereafter, the nationalist movement was divided.    
30 Shot on New Year's Eve 1983 for refusing to pay this 'tax', the Corte-based veterinarian Jean-Paul 
Lafay survived and became active in helping victims of terrorism. He was killed in Ajaccio on 16 June 
1987 after participating in a live TV programme on violence.  
31 A third smaller clandestine organisation was also born: Resistenza, the clandestine wing of the 
Accolta Naziunale Corsa (ANC) which split from Cuncolta. 
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between political violence and common criminality had become vague, earning the 
nationalist movement the general label of "dérive mafieuse".32 
 
The policies of the successive right wing interior ministers from 1986 to 1997 
(interrupted by a Socialist Interior Minister, Joxe, during 1988-1993)33 were 
characterised by repression and a policy of "divide and conquer".  In 1983, the FLNC 
was declared illegal and "dissolved" by the French Government.  The successor to 
Deferre, Interior Minister Charles Pasqua (from the Gaullist RPR— Rassemblement 
pour la République— actually Corsican himself) boasted that he would "terrorise the 
terrorists" during his first term in 1986-1988. During his second term, from 1993 to 
1995 as a result of a period of "cohabitation" between left and right, Pasqua sought to 
placate the terrorists, choosing the FLNC-Canal historique as a privileged 
interlocutor.34 At the same time, relations with rival group FLNC-Canal habituel were 
also cultivated through its political front, the MPA.  The period 1993-1996 was 
marked by a "fratricidal war" with a high number of murders of nationalist militants, 
creating a demand for gun-carriers recruited from the lowest levels of society.  
Interior Minister Debré (also RPR) continued Pasqua's policy of favouring 
discussions with the FLNC-Canal historique.  He became infamous for encouraging 
the FLNC-Canal historique to hold a clandestine press conference announcing a 
suspension of violence before the French Government was due to propose some 
institutional changes.  The public show of strength of the FLNC at Tralonca on 12 
January 1996 overshadowed the message and was a major source of embarrassment 
for the Government.  The explosion of a bomb in Bordeaux at the mayor's office (who 
was Prime Minister Alain Juppé) on 5 October 1996 was used as a pretext to take 
Debré off the Corsican dossier.  While the Prime Minister insisted that the 
Government would deal with elected Corsican representatives only, deals with the 
clandestine militants continued; the presumed leader of the FLNC-Canal historique 
was even offered an important amount of money to leave the country. 
                                               
32 The MPA was even coined by some as the "Mouvement pour les affaires" (Movement for Business). 
33 Charles Pasqua (1986-1988), Pierre Joxe (1988-1993), Pasqua (1993-1995), Jean-Louis Debré 
(1995-1997). 
34 See the account "Pour solde de tout compte" by Jean-Michel Rossi (assassinated on 7 August 2000) 
and François Santoni both members of A Cuncolta Naziunalista, the political front of the FLNC-Canal 
historique (Paris: Editions Denoël, 2000).    
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e. "Re-establishment of the rule of law" 
The assassination of the French Prefect in Corsica, Claude Erignac, on 6 February 
1998 marked a turning point in the history of Corsican nationalism.  Deeply shocked, 
thousands of ordinary Corsicans, with women at the forefront, took to the streets in 
the days following the assassination to voice their protest— a reaction considered 
unusual in a region where a major tradition is that of omerta (law of silence).   A new 
prefect was quickly dispatched and was charged with re-establishing "the rule of law" 
(“l’Etat de droit”).  The logic behind this highly-publicised approach was that the 
same standards should apply to the State and to Corsica; if Corsicans were expected to 
act according to the law, then the State must encourage them by upholding it.  Indeed, 
a main criticism which had been levied against the French State by various Corsican 
actors but also a main finding of several parliament enquiry committees, was that the 
State shared a large degree of responsibility for the misfunctionings (“dérives”) in 
Corsica.35 Although spectacular results were obtained in the area of public order and 
tax collection in 1998,36 the policy of re-establishment of the rule of law soon led to 
exasperation by Corsicans and was perceived as harassment of petty criminals rather 
than aimed at those persons responsible for massive fraud and other more serious 
crimes.  The nationalist milieu in particular did not appreciate the intense police 
scrutiny and arrests it was subjected to in connection with the investigations into the 
Prefect’s murder.  Within a year, the over-zealous Bonnet was involved in two 
scandals: rival investigations into the murder of his predecessor37 and the “affaire des 
paillotes” which exploded in April 1999, leading to his arrest on 3 May 1999.38  
 
                                               
35 See the report on the use of public funds in Corsica by a French parliamentary commission headed 
by Jean Glavany (9 September 1998) (http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/2/2dossiers.html); see also two 
other reports by the Parliament and the Senate on the actions of state security forces in Corsica ("Corse 
- Les Dossiers Noirs", L'Express, 18 November 1999). 
36 For the first time in 50 years, 29 murders were resolved in 1998 (compared to less than 10 in 
previous years), armed robberies were reduced by 60%, and explosions were down by 66%.  Whereas 
40% of companies did not file their V.A.T. declarations, this share was reduced to 5%. 
37 The main suspect, who was the son of a respected Corsican Socialist politician, mysteriously 
disappeared right before the police came to arrest him and went into hiding; he still has not been found.  
38 The French Prefect in Corsica Bernard Bonnet was arrested for his role in the arson attack on an 
illegally-built seaside restaurant (paillote), “Chez Francis”, popular with local politicians.  The affair 
led all the way up to two advisors of the Prime Minister but stopped there.  Clearly, during the illness 
of Interior Minister Chevènement from September 1998 to January 1999, Jospin's office had enjoyed a 
special freedom in dealing with the Corsican dossier, a feeling that had been communicated, willingly 
or not, to the Prefect.  The affair ended with the resignation of the Interior Minister's advisor for 
security matters.  
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3. Evaluation of the French Government's Policies towards Corsica until 1999 
The response of the French State to the problems in Corsica can be characterised as a 
policy of “double diplomacy”: negotiating with the main Corsican political actors 
while at the same time dealing with clandestine movements and playing one against 
the other.  Negotiations (overt or secret) have alternated with periods of open 
repression. The Corsican nationalist movement also practised a double policy of 
clandestine violence and political tactics, setting off bombs while candidates of the 
nationalist parties ran for regional elections.  The policies of left-wing and right-wing 
governments have differed (at least on the surface): indeed, one notes that the two 
attempts at institutional reform were undertaken by socialist interior ministers Deferre 
and Joxe; strong-arm tactics were mostly associated with Gaullist interior ministers.  
The Government's changing conflict regulation policies reflected its ambivalent 
attitudes towards the Corsican Question.  It is not surprising, therefore, that neither 
institutional reform nor alternating tactics of repression and negotiation were 
successful in tackling the chronic political instability and the economic 
underdevelopment of the island; neither did they manage to restore confidence of the 
inhabitants of the island in the French State.  The cycle of violence has persisted and 
the Corsican crisis has become more entrenched with every successive government.  
 
a. Containment of the Conflict  
Violence was on the increase from 1971 to 1998, although not on the same scale as in 
other conflict regions in Europe.  There were about 45 political murders, of which 21 
claimed by nationalists; 11 murders were probably linked to infighting amongst 
nationalists in 1995 alone; to this, one should add widespread racketeering. Violence 
was again on the increase in the second half of 1999 with the appearance of a range of 
new clandestine organisations such as Armata Corsa which claimed an army of 200 
men and smaller groups.  
 
Nationalists grew politically from 1982 to 1992, and were again on the rise in 1998 
and 1999 following a period of electoral decline.  In the 1999 regional elections 
(Loughlin and Daftary 1999: 61), the separatist nationalist votes totalled 19.61% in 
the first round (not including the 3.85% for the UPC autonomists).  The only 
nationalist movement to make it to the second rote of voting, Corsica Nazione, 
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obtained 16.77% (against 9.85% in 1998). This is the best that had been achieved by 
the nationalists since a peak of almost 25% obtained in 1992.  
 
b. Preservation and Promotion of the Minority Identity 
Although undoubtedly faced with challenges in preserving their language (which 
relies heavily on the commitment of parents to transmitting Corsican to their children, 
although there is also a network of private schools "Scuola Corsa"), the situation is by 
no means critical and the island is certainly among the regions of France with the 
strongest regional identities.  One might say that Corsican has been preserved 
"despite" government policies.  A different insight into the question is offered again 
by Briquet (Briquet 1998) according to whom demands to protect the specific 
Corsican language and culture are not a symptom of a suppressed identity.  Rather, 
these demands have been taken up by various political, nationalist and civil society 
actors because of their mobilising potential.  Recognition of these demands and 
institutional measures proposed by the Government result in fights over credit for 
these concessions so that reform actually leads to increased conflict between various 
political interest groups.  
 
c. Political and Institutional Stability 
Corsican institutions have been relatively weak and unstable.  The Corsican Assembly 
in particular has been plagued by intense political instability, with no less than four 
elections between 1982 and 1991 (Savigear 1990).  After the 1991 reforms, both the 
nationalist movement and the main parties were fragmented.  In the 1992 regional 
elections, 13 lists were presented, with two nationalist lists, five from the left and six 
from the right.  This was a result of divisions between those who supported the 1991 
statute and those who opposed it.  In the 1998 and 1999 regional elections, there were 
as many as five nationalist (separatist as well as autonomist) lists. The traditional left 
managed a semblance of unity, with a coalition "gauche plurielle" list (as in the rest 
of France) while the right presented as many as five lists in 1998.  
 
At no point until the "Matignon Process" was genuine autonomy with legislative 
competencies for the local assembly discussed by the Government as a possible 
solution to the Corsican Question. The argument advanced by opponents of autonomy 
was that the founding principles of the French Republic do not allow for an 
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asymmetrical approach to regional specificity. However, as we shall see in the 
following section, Prime Minister Jospin was able to skilfully initiate a process of 
dialogue and joint consultations with Corsican deputies culminating in an original 
compromise proposal on 20 July 2000 which, once elaborated, will serve as the 
foundation for limited autonomy in Corsica.  
 
C. The "Matignon Process" 
 
1. Increasing Demands for Autonomy in Corsica and Beginning of Nationalist 
"Reconciliation" 
Starting in 1998, demands for autonomy and institutional reform became stronger 
within civil society but also within the Corsican Assembly.  It was not so much the 
content of the demands by certain deputies which was noteworthy but the fact that a 
coalition had emerged between certain deputies from the main political parties and the 
nationalist group at the Corsican Assembly ("Corsica Nazione"). This "evolutionary" 
movement was headed by the President of the Assembly, José Rossi (centre-right 
party "Démocratie libérale"), but its main instigator had been another Assembly 
deputy: Paul Giacobbi— a symbol of traditional clanism in Corsica (his father had 
been President of the General Council of North Corsica before him).  His positive 
attitudes on autonomy greatly irritated the Jacobin head of his party (MRG), mayor of 
Bastia and former French government minister Emile Zuccarelli.  The two main 
proposals which emerged from a working group of the Corsican Assembly established 
in April 1999 were a revision of the 1991 Special Statute with a view to devolve 
legislative powers and the abolishment of the two administrative departments of 
North and South Corsica (Annex1).  A few days prior to a planned visit to Corsica by 
the Prime Minister, José Rossi publicly called for autonomy for Corsica.39  
 
At the same time, the nationalist movement had been undergoing significant changes 
during 1998-1999.  It is now marked by two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, a 
recent radicalisation and the appearance of new groups on the fringes of the main 
clandestine organisations has caused consternation that this would herald a new 
                                               
39 Christophe Forcari, "Rossi à Jospin: La Corse veut plus d'autonomie", Libération, 4-5 September 
1999. 
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period of violence.  Investigations into the murder of the French Prefect in Corsica 
concluded that it was intended as a "pure act" to signal a return to the idealist 
nationalism of the 1970s.  This radicalisation contributed to further splintering of the 
clandestine groups (see Annex 3).  At the same time, a process of reconciliation had 
been initiated by the main nationalist groups with the aim of strengthening the 
movement and putting an end to violence between nationalists.40  An umbrella 
organisation, Unità, was formed on 4 November 1999 by nine nationalist 
organisations; their stance on violence in general is, at best, ambiguous.41 Several 
nationalist organisations therefore withdrew from the process because of the refusal to 
condemn all forms of violence.  The reconciliation process was threatened as early as 
June 1999 by a newly created and heavily armed clandestine group Armata Corsa 
which claimed responsibility for the "preventive murder" of a hired hand acting for 
rival nationalist factions.  
 
2. The "Jospin Method"  
For a dialogue to begin, the Prime Minister had clearly stated during his speech to the 
Corsican Assembly on 6 September 1999 that there must be an open condemnation of  
violence.  Thus, at the time of his visit to Corsica, the main issue to be dealt with was 
not institutional reform but violence.  Paradoxically, what triggered the process of 
dialogue was a bomb explosion in broad daylight in Ajaccio on 25 November 1999, 
later claimed by a new group called Clandestinu.42  Perhaps fearing that Corsica 
might fall prey to renewed violence, on 30 November Jospin announced that he was 
willing to meet with elected representatives from the Corsican Assembly.  
 
No direct negotiations were possible with Unità because it had not openly condemned 
violence.  The choice of regional deputies as negotiation partners had one major 
                                               
40 While this initiative did not become public until 3 July 1999 when the 13 nationalist organisations of 
the "Fium'Orbu Committee" signed a joint protocol (two months before Jospin's planned visit to 
Corsica), it is believed to have been launched shortly after the murder of Prefect Erignac.  
41 The main organisations which formed Unità are "A Cuncolta", "Corsica Viva", PPI and ANC. The 
UPC and the MPA were not part of it— the former because of Unità’s refusal to condemn the use of 
violence, the latter because it has been dissolved following the exile of its former leader Alain Orsoni 
in Nicaragua. A second umbrella organisation of "democratic nationalists", Mossa Naziunale / 
"National Movement", was formed soon after by nationalist groups (including the autonomist UPC) 
who refused to join Unità because of its ambiguous stance concerning violence.   
42 This hypothesis is based on the assumption that Clandestinu was probably affiliated with Corsica 
Viva (a member of Unità) and that it was designed as a means of jump-starting dialogue with the 
French Government.  
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implication: the French Government would also be dealing with representatives of the 
most radical nationalist organisation which happened to be the only one represented in 
the Corsican Assembly: Corsica Nazione.43  This was a highly controversial decision 
for, although Corsica Nazione had condemned the murder of the Prefect as well as the 
November bomb attacks— a minimal condemnation which enabled Prime Minister 
Jospin to include them in the negotiations— it consistently refused to condemn the 
men behind the murder whom it viewed as heroes.  Much press coverage was given to 
the unusual alliance between the centre-right President of the Corsican Assembly José 
Rossi and Corsica Nazione deputy Jean-Guy Talamoni.   
 
The decision to deal with regional deputies raised two further questions:  
- whether this group of elected representatives from Corsica was truly 
representative of the Corsican people; not only was civil society and the hundreds 
of mayors left out, but also, after the initial meeting in Paris (see below), so were 
the Corsican politicians who did not have a seat at the Corsican Assembly (incl. 
three Corsican deputies at the French Parliament).    
- whether any solution reached with the agreement of the nationalists of Corsica 
Nazione would guarantee peace.   There are naturally no absolute guarantees of 
peace for three reasons:  (1) the process of reconciliation has only just begun; (2) 
even if Corsica Nazione manages to maintain the support of Unità, the 
organisations behind it might still engage in violent acts as this initiative was 
designed to strengthen the nationalist movement through consolidation, not to 
disarm it.  While some smaller clandestine organisations whose sole purpose was 
to protect their leaders against attacks by rival groups might disappear as a result, 
the larger ones will remain for some time to come and will be a force to reckon 
with if the political negotiations do not go as they wish; (3) finally, there remains 
the possibility of violence perpetrated by armed clandestine organisations outside 
Unità and who were against the negotiations with the French Government.  
 
                                               
43 As a reminder, Corsica Nazione was the only nationalist electoral list to obtain seats in the Corsican 
Assembly in 1998 and 1999.  It is now practically the same as A Cuncolta, the political front of the 
militant nationalists of the FLNC-Canal historique, as the other three parties which had been part of 
this electoral coalition in the 1992 elections withdrew in 1998.  
 
 36
Still, the choice of regional deputies as negotiation partners sent one important 
message: no more secret negotiations nor divide-and-rule tactics; the process was to 
be fully transparent.  In addition, the Prime Minister stressed the importance of 
reaching a general consensus on any decision.  A third feature of the method chosen 
by the Prime Minister was to listen first, draw up a list of the ideas set forth ("droit 
d'inventaire"), and then react.  Finally, although everyone was eager to arrive at a 
solution as fast as possible, Jospin stressed that time must be allowed to take its 
course ("donner du temps au temps").  His political opponents, especially Debré, 
criticised his methods and accused him of buying time and making promises which he 
could not keep beyond the end of his term in 2002.  
 
3. The "Nationalist Method"  
The nationalists have pursued a double strategy of engaging in political negotiations 
while also using the threat of violence.  On the political side, they presented five 
major short-term demands: strict application of the law on protection of the Corsican 
coastline; protection of the wild areas in Corsica; total cessation of "inquisition-style" 
practices of the French administration and justice system; an end to the "de-
Corsification" of jobs;44 and the re-grouping of all "political prisoners" near Bastia, 
Corsica.  It is very interesting to note that the recognition of the "peuple corse" was 
no longer a main nationalist demand, as institutional preoccupations became the main 
subject of discussions.  
 
In December, one day before the first meeting with the Prime Minister was to take 
place in Paris, a series of bomb attacks took place in Corsica. Without claiming 
responsibility for these events, the FLNC-Canal historique announced the following 
day that it would soon make a historic announcement to show its support for political 
dialogue and for the supposed radical change in the French Prime Minister's attitude. 
Accordingly, a major sign of support to the political process was given on 24 
December when four of the largest clandestine organisations, including the one 
                                               
44 This term refers to the increased reliance on labour from outside the island or by immigrants, for 
example during the tourist season, which is in fact a result of the lack of qualified personnel locally. 
Some mainland political actors claim that to give preference to Corsicans for jobs would be 
discriminatory and even racist, comparing this to the policy of "préférence nationale" of the Front 
national / National Front.  
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responsible for the November 1999 bombs in Ajaccio,45 announced a "cease-fire" as 
well as a fusion between them— an unprecedented event in the history of Corsican 
nationalism!  At the same time, Unità put pressure throughout the process on the two 
nationalist deputies seeking to obtain concrete concessions (such as the re-grouping of 
prisoners) and threatened to withdraw support for the negotiations.  Towards the end 
of the Matignon Process, stakes were raised when responsibility for four bombs, one 
of which was found undetonated in Paris, was claimed by the FLNC.  Paradoxically, 
the FLNC claimed that this did not signify an end of the "cease-fire" of 24 December.  
Seen by some as a warning sign to the French Government, it was interpreted by 
others as an internal message designed to placate the more impatient elements in 
favour of a show of strength. 
 
4. The Negotiations  
Two major meetings took place in Paris between the Prime Minister and elected 
representatives from Corsica, on 13 December and 6 April respectively.  While at the 
first meeting, "Matignon I", 28 representatives were present, including the Senators 
and Parliament members from Corsica, only 22 regional deputies were involved in 
"Matignon II" and  subsequent meetings which, starting on 15 May, were held every 
Monday in Paris.  At these "Lundis de Matignon" (Matignon Mondays), three persons 
represented the French Government: Jospin's advisor for Corsican affairs Alain 
Christnacht (the person behind the new statute for New Caledonia, see below), the 
Corsican Prefect Jean-Pierre Lacroix, and the head of the Interior Minister's office, 
Christian Proust.  Thus, what began as a high-level negotiation evolved into a genuine 
and in-depth discussion of the main issues raised by the Corsican deputies.  
Gradually, six "dossiers" emerged: questions related to European integration; taxes; 
economic development; language and culture; institutional reform (simplification of 
administrative structures); and devolution of legislative competencies.  A compromise 
seemed possible on issues such as economic development, fiscal matters, and even the 
mandatory teaching of Corsican, while the thorniest issues were the devolution of 
legislative competencies for the Corsican Assembly and the simplification of the 
administrative structure of Corsica (abolishment of the two departments).  There were 
                                               
45 The four clandestine organisations which merged to form the 'new FLNC' were: FLNC-Canal 
historique, FLNC du 5 mai (1996), Fronte Ribellu, and Clandestinu. 
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also serious disagreements among the Corsican deputies concerning the devolution of 
legislative competencies, as witnessed in the vote in March of two different proposals 
by the Corsican Assembly to the French Government.46  
 
5. The Compromise of 20 July 2000 
On 10 July, having submitted synthesis notes on the main dossiers discussed a week 
earlier, the Government sought to limit the options by making a first series of 
proposals to the Corsican deputies. Two issues remained open: the question of 
administrative simplification and that of legislative competency.  On the first point, 
the Government offered two possibilities: either a single Corsican region with a single 
département formed by the fusion of the two current ones, or a single region with no 
département (abolishment of the two départements)— and indicating its strong 
preference for the first option (already in force in some DOM) which would not entail 
a revision of the Constitution.  On the issue of legislative competency, the Prime 
Minister expressed the opinion that the areas in which the Corsican deputies had 
wanted a transfer of powers did not justify a transfer of such competency.  But Jospin 
had also prepared a genuine coup de théâtre: a possibility was found to grant the 
Corsican Assembly regulatory powers— not legislative competency— in certain areas.  
Based on a 28 July 1993 decision of the Constitutional Council regarding educational 
institutions (unearthed by the head of Jospin's cabinet, Olivier Schrameck, who served 
as general secretary for the Constitutional Council), this proposal consisted of an 
experimental transfer of regulatory powers for a specific period of time and subject to 
the subsequent ratification by the French Parliament in order for these adaptations to 
become permanent.  The Prime Minister also proposed to implement article 26 of the 
1991 Special Statute which allows the Corsican Assembly to submit proposals 
concerning draft French laws so that they may be adapted to Corsican specificities.   
 
                                               
46 Rather than adopting a compromise proposal, two motions were passed by the Corsican Assembly on 
10 March 2000: a minority one (22 votes) in favour of autonomy, backed by the President of the 
Corsican Assembly, the nationalists, and the "Corsistes"; and a majority motion (26 votes) in favour of 
more decentralisation but against autonomy, backed by the "nationaux-républicans", headed by Emile 
Zuccarelli. This surprising outcome, due to Zuccarelli producing his alternative proposal while serious 
attempts were being made to reach a general consensus, caused the Government quite some 
embarrassment as it was not sure how to proceed.  The nationalists in particular were taken aback as 
they had made significant concessions in order for a compromise to be reached with the other deputies 
(see: Christophe Forcari, "L'autonomie trébuche à l'assemblée corse. Le texte Zuccarelli a devancé la 
motion Rossi-nationalistes," Libération, 11-12 March 2000). 
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The Government also proposed that, on questions related to European Integration, a 
list of requested dispensations be drawn up jointly and presented to the European 
Commission as soon as possible. 
 
Still, Jospin's proposals of 10 July were not deemed satisfactory by the nationalists, 
backed by the President of the Corsican Assembly José Rossi, who insisted on 
devolution of legislative power (which would entail a revision of the Constitution and 
would therefore be a permanent step).  The experimental and temporary nature of the 
proposed mechanism raised concerns that it could be taken away by a decision of the 
Constitutional Council; it was also not clear whether this 1993 ruling might legally be 
applicable to Corsica.  On the other hand, these proposals were already too far-
reaching for Zuccarelli (and several other members of the Corsican Assembly) who 
believed that such steps would ultimately lead to independence.  After not-very-
transparent lunchtime negotiations, Rossi claimed the support of the majority of the 
Assembly deputies for a two-phase plan.  The main idea of this counter-proposal was 
to enlist the support of the nationalists by introducing a phased approach, with a first 
phase— from 2000 until 2002— during which the proposal of the Prime Minister for 
an experimental transfer of regulatory powers would be tried out; however, guarantees 
were demanded for a revision of the Constitution after 2002 so that the subsequent 
approval of the French Parliament would no longer be required and that the process 
become irreversible.  The Corsican deputies also opted for abolishing the two 
administrative departments and having only a Corsican region with an assembly to be 
established in the 2004 regional elections (a constitutional revision will therefore be 
necessary as the département is the basic administrative building block).  
 
The seventh months of joint negotiations finally culminated in a compromise 
presented in the name of the French Government on 20 July 2000 to the Corsican 
deputies gathered at Matignon (Annex 4).47 This time, the proposals of 20 July were 
approved by an overwhelming majority of the deputies at the Corsican Assembly on 
28 July (with 2 votes against and 5 abstentions). The general aims of the proposed 
reforms, as stated in this document, are to better take into account the specificity of 
                                               
47 Before this meeting, the Prime Minister had taken care to gather his ministers to inform them and to 
obtain their support. 
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Corsica within the (French) Republic, to clarify responsibility in the management of 
the island,  to promote its economic and social development, and to establish the 
lasting foundations for civil peace. No mention is made of the "peuple corse" which 
had not been an element in the negotiations.  In this counter-counter-proposal 
incorporating most of the new proposals worked out by Corsican side, the French 
Government proposed a two-phased approach:  
 
- A transitory phase (2000-2002) during which the maximum number of measures 
not requiring a modification of the Constitution would be introduced.  
- A second "constitutional" phase (2002-2004) would then follow, after evaluation 
of the transitory phase. A major precondition for embarking in this second phase 
of the devolution process is the "durable re-establishment of civil peace".  Also, 
this phase would only begin after the general French elections and only if the 
parties then in power agree (an important element is that a constitutional revisions 
may only be undertaken with the  approval of the French President, which Jospin 
hopes to become in 2002).  
 
More concretely, the measures outlined on 20 July were as follows: 
 
a. Institutional Structures  
A single region / collectivité will replace the current structure of one region plus two 
departments. This reform can only be implemented after 2004, pending revision of the 
Constitution and when the term of the current Assembly has expired.   
 
b. Legislative Competencies 
New competencies may be devolved to Corsica in the following spheres: land and 
infrastructure planning; economic development; education; professional training; 
sports; tourism; environmental protection; transportation. Two complementary 
mechanisms are proposed:  
1-Regulatory Powers: a modified implementation of article 26 of the 1991 Statute.  
Rather than having to submit proposals for modifications to French laws, through 
its deliberations the Corsican Assembly may adapt regulatory documents to the 
specific situation of Corsica 
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Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement de doter la collectivité 
territoriale de Corse d'un pouvoir réglementaire, permettant d'adapter les 
textes réglementaires par délibération de l'assemblée 
 
2-Power to Adapt Laws during a transition phase, based on decision no 93-322 of 
28 July 1993 of the Constitutional Council.  In certain limited spheres, under 
certain conditions, and for a certain period of time, the Corsican Assembly would 
be able to derogate from French laws. any derogation would have to be evaluated 
and approved by the French Parliament 
 
S'agissant de l'adaptation de dispositions législatives, le Gouvernement 
proposera au Parlement de donner à la collectivité territoriale de Corse la 
possibilité de déroger, par ses délibérations, à certaines dispositions de 
législatives, dans des conditions que le Parlement définirait … 
 
A second phase will follow, once the administrative simplification has taken place, 
when the new Corsican Assembly, to be established in 2004, would have the 
possibility to adapt French laws without subsequent ratification by the French 
Parliament 
Le Parlement pourrait ainsi autoriser l’assemblée territoriale de Corse à 
adapter par ses délibérations, dans certains domaines précisément 
déterminés et dans le respect des principes qu’il aura fixés, des dispositions 
législatives déjà en vigueur ou en cours d’examen. Les délibérations 
adoptées par l’assemblée de Corse dans ces conditions seraient, sous réserve 
de l’exercice des voies de recours devant la juridiction administrative, 
exécutoires. De valeur réglementaire, elles ne seraient pas soumises à une 
validation ultérieure obligatoire de la part du législateur. 
 
This power to "adapt legal measures" ("faculté d'adaptation de mesures 
législatives") without subsequent approval by the French Parliament also 
necessitates a revision of the Constitution.48 
 
c. Fiscal Matters 
The Government also proposes a new fiscal system of tax credits over a period of 10 
years designed to encourage investment in the sectors where they are needed most 
(the hotel business, new technologies, industry, energy). These measures, which are 
also designed to spur economic growth in the least developed areas inland, will 
                                               
48 According to article 34 of the French Constitution, "la loi est votée par le parlement" ("statutes shall 
be passed by Parliament").    
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replace the free zone in 2002. Regarding the special inheritance tax regime49, the 
transitory period for maintenance of the full exemption regime is extended to ten 
years; after that, for a further period of five years, only 50% tax will be levied. 
 
d. The Corsican Language 
Corsican will be taught in kindergartens and primary schools during normal hours as a 
mandatory subject, unless parents are opposed.  Additional measures are proposed to 
ensure sufficient supply of qualified teachers without however making knowledge of 
Corsican a requirement for employment.   
 
e. Economic Development 
A 15 year public investment plan for Corsica is proposed, to be financed jointly by the 
State (70%) and Corsica, in order to catch up with other French regions; sectors to 
receive special support include road and rail infrastructure.  
 
6. Assessment 
Will Corsica enjoy a form of autonomy? The issue which caused the most confusion 
was whether legislative power would be devolved to the new Corsican Assembly.50 
This point is crucial in determining whether Corsica will enjoy a limited form of 
political autonomy or mere administrative autonomy. The term "auberge espagnole"51 
was used to explain the diverging interpretations of the proposals which seemed to 
satisfy both those who had categorically refused the devolution of legislative powers 
and constitutional revisions as well as those who would not settle for less.  Corsican 
Assembly President Rossi hailed the Government's proposal as an innovation, mid-
way between mere regulatory powers and legislative competencies. The nationalists, 
too, seemed satisfied that their demand for legislative power had been fulfilled; but, in 
                                               
49 Under the previous regime, established by the so-called "arrêtés Miot", Corsicans were exempted 
from paying inheritance taxes. This special regime was to be abolished in 1999 (but later extended to 
2001) to bring Corsica in line with the rest of France.   
50 In the days before a final compromise was reached, certain Corsican deputies and the press claimed 
that the State was ready to grant "shared and limited legislative powers" ("un pouvoir législatif partagé 
et encadré") (Christophe Forcari, "Vers un statut expérimental pour la Corse. L'Etat est prêt à accorder 
un 'pouvoir législatif partagé et encadré' à l'Assemblée territoriale", Libération, 11 July 2000); but this 
expression had never been used by the Government. 
51 Literally "Spanish Inn", perhaps the best English/American equivalent is "potluck" where everyone 
brings his or her own favourite dish (see for example, Christophe Forcari, "Matignon fait le Grand 
Accord," Libération 21 July 2000). 
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their eyes, this was only a first step in a longer process which they hoped would lead 
towards independence. Whether the power to adapt laws without subsequent approval 
by the French Parliament, which the Corsican Assembly would be given in 2004 after 
revision of the Constitution, would consist of a power to adapt French laws or to pass 
specific Corsican laws52 will not be fully clarified until a draft law has been prepared 
by the French Government.  This draft law is expected in Fall 2000 for adoption by 
the Parliament before the end of 2001.  At this stage, then, we can say that Corsica 
will probably have the power to adapt French laws in very limited areas of special 
concern only.  We should therefore speak of a limited transfer of legislative power.  
 
The creation of a single Corsican region, without parallel state administration through 
the departments, was perhaps the second most significant measure as it would result 
in an asymmetric organisation of the French State. However, some of the non-
institutional measures are also very important in the French context.  The linguistic 
measures proposed, although weak in comparison to some other regions of Western 
Europe where the language of the minority enjoys a minimum official status in the 
region concerned, are daring in a country where the French language is the sole 
language recognised in the Constitution: "The language of the Republic shall be 
French" (article 2).53  The mandatory teaching of Corsican is controversial even for 
some Corsicans who jealously protect their language and do not wish to see non-
Corsican children learn it!  Other positive elements in the 20 July proposals are the 
fiscal incentives and economic autonomy needed for establishment of a functional 
autonomy.  
                                               
52 The latter is conceivable within the French context; the Congress of New Caledonia, for example, 
has the power to adopt local laws ("lois du pays") and French Polynesia wants the same. 
53 This new provision, added to article 2 of the French Constitution in 1992 in the context of European 
enlargement, caused great problems when France was considering ratifying the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages.  
 44
V. AUTONOMY AS A MODE OF CONFLICT REGULATION ? LESSONS FROM THE 
ÅLAND AND CORSICA CASES 
 
Success is a relative term in the case of conflict regulation; it depends on whether it is 
evaluated based on containment of the conflict and prevention of violence, or whether 
one looks at whether the root causes of the conflict have been addressed, for example 
concerns about protection of the minority identity or economic under-development.  
Especially in the case of high-level negotiations, what might be a political success for 
the élites involved might not enjoy the support of the population as a whole. Two 
more comments must be made: (1) it is important to keep in mind the time factor, and 
to evaluate conflict regulation throughout time and whether one or the other approach 
allows for maturation of the actors and revision (for improvement) of the settlement; 
(2) in the same way, it is important to note that despite an overall “failure” at a 
particular point in time, there might be elements of success within a particular 
approach which might work better within a different combination of measures.  This 
having been said, the two cases studied must be briefly evaluated and elements which 
contributed to success will be highlighted.  
 
A. Lessons from the Åland Case  
 
The Åland case indeed deserves attention as a successful case of conflict regulation 
through the development of autonomy based on compromise between the conflict 
parties, even though the early years of autonomy were not always without difficulties, 
especially concerning the jurisdiction of the local authorities.  
 
The autonomy of Åland, which was jointly developed by the Finnish State and the 
Åland authorities, has shown that autonomy can succeed in settling a conflict, even in 
the case of a strategically sensitive area (at the time).  The autonomy established in 
1920-1922 has become ever stronger, with amendments in 1951 and 1991.  Although 
the arrangements contain elements of minority protection, protection of the territory 
was the central concern.  The settlement of the Åland conflict displays several 
interesting characteristics which have contributed to its success and which may be 
relevant for the regulation of disputes in other regions (Lapidoth 1997: 70-77; 
Modeen 1991: 167).  
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- Strong guarantees that the specific character of the autonomous region will be 
preserved (language and education provisions, regional citizenship). 
- Consensus Agreement.  In the case of the Åland Islands, the fact that a consensus 
existed as to what the Åland population wanted acted as a positive factor, even 
though this might seem paradoxical for it was not autonomy but reunification 
with Sweden which the majority wanted. Even before Finland declared 
independence, the wish for reunion with Sweden had been presented to the 
Swedish King and Government, supported by a petition which had been signed 
by an overwhelming majority of the resident adult population. Reaching a 
consensus was facilitated by the fact that the population was quite 
homogeneously Swedish-speaking.  It has been difficult so far to constitute a 
stable majority in Corsica for a particular solution due to the high degree of 
political fragmentation, both of mainstream but also nationalist parties, and 
disagreements over the extent of autonomy which Corsica needs.     
- Open attitude of both the central and as well as Åland politicians which has 
facilitated discussions and enabled the statute to be improved over time.  What 
perhaps contributed to Finnish good will was the fact that the Åland conflict was 
limited to a well-defined territory and did not threaten to spill over to other 
Swedish-speaking regions of Finland (Modeen 1991: 155).54  This made it easier 
in a sense for Finland to make important concessions to the Åland Islands. 
- The autonomy of Åland was created in the framework of a state system which 
recognises the equality of Finnish- and Swedish-speakers (1919 Constitution, 
Language Act of 1922 and section 17 in the 1999 Constitution).  This status and 
the recognition of two equally valid cultures has without doubt made the 
settlement of the conflict easier.  
- Flexibility of the autonomous regime, allowing for transfer of administrative 
authority from the state to the autonomous region and vice-versa.  
- Possibility of evolution. The autonomy provisions have been amended several 
times, always with the assent of the provincial authorities.  The introduction of 
changes requires an act of the Finnish Parliament, in accordance with the 
                                               
54 No separatist movement existed among the Swedish-speakers in the other Finnish provinces, even 
though there were demands for self-government.   
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procedure for amending the Constitution, as well as approval of the Lagting by at 
least a two-thirds majority.  Revisions do not necessarily mean failure of the 
previous statute, but might also reflect constant improvement based on increasing 
experience.  This process of step-by-step evolution and the conditions under 
which the statute may be revised seem to have worked well, even though some 
Ålanders would say that evolution has been too slow.  
- Obligation to consult the autonomous authorities (this obligation was increased by 
the 1991 Åland autonomy act) in matters which affect it and the existence of other 
mechanisms  aiming at ensuring that Åland’s interests are represented and that it 
has a say, even in spheres which do not lie directly within its competence (e.g. 
European matters, regional co-operation, etc). These have contributed to the 
success of the autonomy regime. 
- The existence of an organ of Cupertino between the Finnish Government and 
Åland which may also act as an informal dispute settlement mechanism in certain 
areas.  Although it is hard to say whether this would prove sufficient to resolve 
disputes, it certainly has the potential.  
- Involvement of international actors.  Without the involvement of the League of 
Nations and other international actors, Finland would not have agreed to a special 
status for Åland.  
- The attitude of Sweden, which shares the cultural and language features with 
Åland, also greatly contributed to success.  By collaborating in the establishment 
of autonomy through the 1921 agreement and by renouncing to the Åland Islands 
thereafter, even after the Second World War when the wish for reunion was again 
expressed by the Ålanders, Sweden greatly contributed to a positive atmosphere. 
Sweden, which remains a party to the agreement, has continued to contribute to 
the stability of Åland’s autonomy regime by refraining from criticising Finland's 
handling of the Åland question. 
- Absence of violence from the beginning. 
 
As a final note, although the 1991 Autonomy Act does not include any special 
provisions for the settlement of disputes between Finland and the Åland Islands, it 
does contain numerous safeguards.  In the sphere of adjudication, an appeal against 
the legality of a decision by the Åland government may be brought before the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (section 25(2)).  Furthermore, any dispute 
 47
between the State and the province in other spheres must be settled by the Supreme 
Court.  Lapidoth (1997: 76) views the Åland Delegation as an informal organ of 
mediation.  It is indeed authorised to settle disputes in certain spheres, e.g. in 
controversies concerning the opening of new merchant shipping lanes or the 
allocation of land in Åland for State administration purposes (section 62).  It may also 
be called upon to issue an opinion upon request either by the State or by the provincial 
authorities (section 56).  Finally, the system by which Åland draft laws must first be 
submitted to the Åland Delegation before they go to the Finnish President also aims to 
avoid a presidential veto which might give rise to a dispute.  Thus far, no major 
dispute has arisen to test the ability of the Åland Delegation. 
 
B. Applicability of Elements from the Åland Case to Corsica 
 
What lessons may be drawn on autonomy as a mode of conflict regulation in Corsica, 
based on the experience of the Åland Islands?    
 
The Åland case is often presented as a successful solution of a minority conflict.  
However, many Ålanders take a different view as they see the conflict as having been 
mainly a territorial dispute between Sweden and Finland.55  In this regard, it seems 
particularly relevant for Corsica where an insular territory is the main reference point 
for the minority identity which is perceived as being under threat from assimilatory 
influences from the mainland.  Major differences between the two contexts are also 
apparent: Ålanders did not want independence but reunion with Sweden, there was a 
consensus among the population as to what it wanted, and there was international 
involvement as it was decided, because of  Åland's international demilitarised status, 
that it was a matter of international concern. Last but not least, the political culture in 
the two cases is fundamentally different, with a tradition not of political violence but 
compromise in the Åland case.   
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Åland case was the concept of "regional 
citizenship". There is no question of introducing a specific "Corsican citizenship" yet, 
                                               
55 Barbro Sundback, The Åland Islands - A Success Story. Paper presented at the conference "Culture, 
Nation and Region in Europe," 10-11 September 1998.  
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even if this is interpreted in a broader sense to include those who are long-term 
residents ("communauté de destin": community of those who wish to share the destiny 
of the Island).  Precisely both these elements have been granted in the case of an 
Overseas Territories, New Caledonia (and soon in French Polynesia) where the 
Caledonian "Congress" has the competency to vote local laws ("lois du pays") in a 
whole range of areas; there is also a Caledonian citizenship which is necessary to be 
able to vote.56  This would have been an important measure in an island where 
persons who have de facto not resided there for decades or who have long been dead 
are still able to have say.  The only measures concerning protection of the Corsican 
identity are linguistic. 
 
Another interesting feature of the Åland case for Corsica was the process of 
developing autonomy in stages.  Even though the extent of the measures proposed in 
the two cases are very different, one can say that the evolutionary process of the 
autonomy of the Åland Islands constitutes a relevant example for Corsica which, like 
Åland, might soon receive a third statute.  A legitimate question is where the process 
will end, in other words, whether autonomy will be a lasting solution for Corsica, or 
whether, as the nationalists hope, this is merely the first step in a longer process 
leading towards independence.  Legal innovations and institutional reform are good 
but might not be sufficient to remedy the chronic political instability and economic 
and social under-development of Corsica.  Pending major transformation of the 
Corsican political class, it is difficult to envisage a prosperous, sovereign Corsica 
without the intervention of the central state.  The majority of Corsicans do not want to 
left alone with their politicians, as reflected in the low support for independence.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
56 Following the Noumea Accords of April 1998 between the French Government, the loyalists of the 
RPCR and the separatist FLNKS, a referendum was held in New Caledonia in November 1998, 
approving a new statute which will lead to a gradual transfer of powers over a period of 15 years to the 
elected assembly or Congress which enjoys legislative powers in a number of areas.  Furthermore, a 
Caledonian citizenship has been created, conferring privileges on the local job market. The French 
Constitution had to be revised before the referendum was held. 
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C. Prospects for Success of Autonomy in Corsica 
 
1. Application of Lapidoth's Autonomy Success Factors  
As an indicator of the prospects for success of autonomy in Corsica, it is useful to first 
attempt an application of the autonomy success factors developed by Lapidoth to  
Corsica (Table 1). 57 
 
1. Consent of the population? NO. Although a consensus seems to have finally 
reached amongst the politicians, the opinion of Corsican society as a whole as not 
been determined. Polls indicate that it is divided. 
2. Consent of foreign state with same ethnic or other affiliation. N.A. (No foreign 
state with which Corsicans have an ethnic or other affiliation exists.) 
3. Regime beneficial for both state and autonomous region. Probably YES. The 
regime should certainly be beneficial for Corsica; as to the State, it will probably 
continue to heavily subsidise the autonomy regime for some time to come.  
4. Symbolic paraphernalia of self-determination. NO. It is highly improbable that the 
Moor's head which is the Corsican emblem will be accepted as an official flag nor 
will the language be accorded an official status. One highly symbolic matter which 
needs to finally be resolved is the recognition of the "peuple corse".  
5. Clearly defined division of powers. YES. Still, a clear definition of the division of 
powers will be a great challenge, especially given that this is a first experimental 
attempt. At least the administrative simplification of Corsica will facilitate this task as 
there will be no state administration through the departments. Debate might arise over 
social matters which have not been expressly mentioned as being within the authority 
of the Corsican Assembly; however, the unions strongly advocate this.   
6. Consultation. MAYBE YES. This will be attempted by applying article 26 of the 
1991 statute.   
7 & 8. Organ for co-operation, dispute settlement mechanisms. NO. A major 
deficiency might be that no dispute settlement mechanism exists nor has an organ for 
co-operation between the central government and the local authorities been 
established.   
                                               
57 "YES" indicates that this factor is present, "NO" that it is not. It could also be too early to say, in 
which case a prudent "unclear" will be indicated.   
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9. & 13. Autonomy in stages and clearly defined options. MAYBE YES. A definition 
of stages has been done by establishing two short term phases from 2000-2002, and 
2002-2004. However, it is not at all clear what will follow, and what the procedures 
for evaluating the functioning of the regime will be. In the case of New Caledonia, a 
15-year time frame was chosen and it would be desirable to plan ahead for Corsica as 
well, making clear what the Government's stance on independence is and whether a 
referendum is to be held at some point.  
10. Democracy. YES. Both the central government and the regional authorities are 
democratic, although there are hindrances to democracy because of persistent 
electoral fraud, corruption and nationalist threat of violence.      
11. Guarantees for the respect of human rights. YES. The French Constitution, which 
strictly upholds the principle of equality, is the legal reference. Fears that the rights of 
non-Corsicans, especially immigrants, might not be protected explain the reticence of 
the Government to discuss the establishment of a Corsican "regional citizenship".  It 
also explains why even in the recruitment of teachers, two separate systems will be 
established for Corsican-speakers and non Corsican-speakers so that the latter are not 
discriminated against. 
12. Similar stage of relative economic development. NO. Corsica does not enjoy a 
rather similar stage of economic development and standard of living and it will take 
some time to make up for the neglect which has caused this situation.  
14. International rules of behaviour. NO. The settlement of conflict in Corsica is 
considered a purely internal affair where only French law is applicable, not 
international norms. Not even the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages can be referred to for language standards as it has not been ratified by 
France.   
15. Atmosphere of goodwill. Probably YES. There has been much effort by the Prime 
Minister and his advisors to show goodwill and openness with respect to the demands 
presented by the Corsican deputies. However, good will is lacking among important 
actors in the French Government, notably the Interior Minister, and among some local 
politicians who only very grudgingly endorsed the proposals as well as those who 
voted against or abstained. Much will depend on the outcome of the 2002 presidential 
elections and the situation in Corsica until then.     
16. Autonomy established before serious deterioration. Unclear. Autonomy might 
have come too late; however, relations between the French population and the Corsica 
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are not characterised by hatred but rather frustration or even indifference. This might 
actually be a positive feature although scepticism amongst the general French 
population is high.   
 
2. Potential Obstacles or "Autonomy Failure Factors" 
 
a. Political Divisions within Corsica and the French Government 
As we have seen, the Corsican political class has been traditionally highly fragmented 
and has displayed major inconsistencies and shifting positions during the Matignon 
Process, suggesting political deals behind the scene.  Rifts have appeared also within 
parties between the national and the Corsican sections, for example within the RPR 
whose national president is strongly opposed to autonomy in Corica while Jean 
Baggioni, the RPR President of the Corsican Executive Council, who in March 2000 
had voted against devolution of legislative power, voted in favour in July 2000.  
 
Within the French Government, there was a significant opposition by the 
"souverainistes" such as Interior Minister Chevènement and his colleagues of the 
MDC (Mouvement des Citoyens).  Disagreements between the Prime Minister and the 
Interior Minister during the “Matignon Process” threatened to result in a 
governmental crisis. Finally, on 29 August, the Interior Minister resigned, having 
explicitly stated that he will not be the one to present the draft law on Corsica to the 
Parliament.  He was replaced by a close collaborator of Jospin who supports the 
Corsican reforms. As to French President Chirac, after a certain silence he voiced his 
prudent support for "reform".  His mandate expires in 2002 and so the success of the 
process greatly depends on his successor.  
 
Finally, these were élite negotiations; it is therefore difficult to say, without holding 
some kind of poll or referendum, what the majority of Corsicans want.  The 
nationalists support the idea of a referendum on the future of Corsica; however, they 
wish to poll only Corsicans and those who have resided in the island for a certain 
period of time, excluding civil servants who are there for a short period; this poses 
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problems of constitutionality.58  The second limitation is that it may not be held on a 
question directly entailing revision of the Constitution (Corsicans may not be asked 
whether they wish to see the transfer of legislative competencies) but they may be 
asked to decide on the adoption of a law which would lead to decentralisation of 
additional powers to Corsica.  A third option would be to revise the Constitution 
before a Corsican referendum, as was done in the case of New Caledonia. This 
"Caledonian Logic" is strongly rejected by the Jacobins, notably Interior Minister 
Chevènement and his colleague Georges Sarre of the Jacobin MDC (Mouvement des 
Citoyens), and Zuccarelli.  Calls for a referendum also emerged from those who 
opposed autonomy, such as former Interior Minister Debré who wants the entire 
country to be polled, expecting the results to be against autonomy.  
 
b. Renewal of Nationalist Violence 
The process might also be disrupted by a decision by the nationalists to resort again to 
violence rather than dialogue. Violence by clandestine movements which are not part 
of the nationalist reconciliation effort might also disrupt the process in the interest of 
those who wish to preserve the status quo. One problem is that the precondition of 
"durable re-establishment of civil peace" set forth by the Government in the 20 July 
proposals has not been clearly defined.  It was therefore not clear whether the two 
assassinations which occurred in August and September 2000 constituted a breach of 
the "cease-fire".  
 
Problems might arise especially over the issue of amnesty for "political prisoners". 
Amnesties have been granted before: in 1981 upon election and again in 1988 upon 
re-election by Mitterrand as a conciliatory gesture towards Corsican nationalists.  
However, that nationalists want amnesty to include those convicted of murder is 
deemed particularly outrageous by various French political actors as it would mean 
pardoning the assassins of the Corsican Prefect.  This issue was not openly debated 
during the Matignon process and there was no mention of the Government's official 
position on the question in the proposals of 20 July.  Jospin's opponents sharply 
                                               
58 According to legal experts, a referendum may be held on a limited part of France but it can only be 
consultative (no legal obligation for the government to act on the results). 
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criticised him for not openly stating that there would be no amnesty, at least not for 
Erignac's murderers. The issue remains open and threatens to come up repeatedly. 
 
c. Corruption 
The Corsican experience has demonstrated the importance of coupling institutional 
solutions with the financial means to carry them out and economic and fiscal 
measures to ensure development.  However, this cannot be done in a context of 
widespread corruption of the entrenched local élite. This threatens to seriously hamper 
implementation of the autonomy measures.  This is also one of the main reasons why 
there is so much opposition to devolving legislative power to local Corsican 
politicians.  
 
3. Prospects for Success of the Matigon Proposals 
What lessons then may be drawn on the prospects for success of the Matignon 
proposals and, more generally, on autonomy as a mode of conflict regulation in 
Corsica?   As we have seen above, the prospects for success of the Matignon Process 
are mixed.  There are positive elements, not least in the compromise reached among 
the deputies of the Corsican Assembly and the efforts of the nationalists to unify and 
to engage in political dialogue. The élite negotiations at Matignon were a learning 
process for all those involved, especially the nationalists who for the first time were 
equal partners in a democratic political dialogue.  However, there are major obstacles 
as well.  What can be said at this still early stage is that very few of success factors are 
present at the moment while there are many external obstacles.  Some major steps 
need to be taken, including a referendum in Corsica, to enlist the support of the people 
designed to benefit from these reforms and to create the favourable conditions for 
their implementation. The content of the proposals must also be carefully developed, 
especially where the competencies of the new Corsican Assembly are concerned. 
Once the draft law on the third Corsican statute has been prepared for the French 
Parliament, it will be easier to assess the content of the autonomy proposals for 
Corsica. The work has only just begun and it will take much legal and political skill to 
enact the reforms to the end, leading to a third statute for Corsica.   
 
Admittedly, the lessons drawn from the failure (so far) of conflict regulation in 
Corsica do not bode well for autonomy as a solution to the Corsican conflict. 
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Undeniably, local political actors in Corsica are to blame to some extent for the 
failure of the successive statutes.  Perhaps they never truly felt responsible for the 
course the island was taking; this attitude was reinforced by the attitude of the French 
State which treated them like they could not be trusted.59 Unless an entirely new 
generation of Corsican politicians emerges, it is hard to see how this might change in 
the near future. The reasons for the persistent crisis may also be traced to the 
weakness of the French State in Corsica or to what has been termed the "Crisis of the 
State" (crise de l'État). This emanates from several parliamentary investigations over 
the past two years which have come to harsh conclusions on the performance of the 
French State in Corsica in many spheres.  However, there has been a considerable 
evolution in attitudes and a new generation of politicians who reject the rule of the 
clans is slowly coming to power. There is furthermore more interest in similar 
developments in the rest of Europe and a realisation that Corsica must seize on a 
historic opportunity to evolve.  
 
Despite widespread scepticism amongst the population on the mainland60 and in 
Corsica, there are high hopes in Corsica and in Paris that a third statute will restore 
mutual trust between the French State and Corsica and put an end to the nationalist 
violence which has plagued the island for decades.  But for this to happen, the local 
political élites must also make room for the "political" nationalists so that they might 
better integrate the public sphere rather than opt for clandestine militancy and 
violence (Briquet 1998: 37).   
 
                                               
59 In 1988, then Interior Minister Joxe had chided the deputies of the Corsican Assembly for not having 
succeeded in adopting a development scheme for Corsica, despite several extensions; in the end, the 
Prefect had to do the job. 
60 According to an opinion poll realised on 21 July, 46% of the French population believe that the 
measures announced by the Government on 20 July will not lead to civil peace in Corsica against 45% 
who believe that they will; 9% were unsure. 59% were favourable to enabling the Corsican Assembly 
to adapt French laws to the specific situation of the island under supervision of the Parliament, while 
30% were against. Support was much lower for a power to adapt laws without subsequent approval by 
Parliament, with 61% against and only 34% in favour (IFOP poll of 802 persons, published on 23 July 
2000 in the Journal du Dimanche, cited in Le Monde, 25 July 2000). 
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VI. CONCLUSION: CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN CORSICA THROUGH AUTONOMY?  
 
The study above shows that autonomy can be a method of resolving territorial 
conflicts and that  it presents particular advantages in the case of insular regions. 
However, while in the case of Åland, autonomy was a clear success which was 
furthermore strengthened by two successive statutes, many obstacles are present in the 
Corsican case related mainly to the history of State-region relations and local political 
actors. Success factors which were instrumental in the case of Åland, such as the unity 
of the Ålanders and the intervention of outside actors (League of Nations), are absent 
in Corsica. The new proposals for reform are a positive step for two reasons: process 
and content. However, one must be sober in assessing the prospects for success of the 
Matignon Proposals of 20 July 2000 and foresee periodic eruptions of violence. 
Further revisions and fine-tuning will no doubt be needed and this should ideally 
already be foreseen in the draft law.  The year 2002, when the French general 
elections will be held, will be a crucial turning point in the process. Indeed, the new 
parties in power will then have to initiate the irreversible, second phase of the reform 
process which will result in the devolution of limited legislative power to a new 
Corsican Assembly to be established in 2004.  
 
In seeking to evaluate the broader impact of the autonomy proposals for Corsica by 
the French Government, one very important question comes to mind: Was the threat 
of violence by nationalists  instrumental in the process and in obtaining concessions 
from the Government? Indeed, given the use of violence at key stages in the process, 
one must ask whether the process was not to a certain extent run by nationalists, as 
many French politicians and most of the French media have claimed. One notes that 
the process was launched right after a series of bomb attacks in Ajaccio, that another 
series of bombs exploded one day before the first meeting in December; and that yet 
more bombs were found in June shortly before the French Government was due to 
make its first proposals.61  Furthermore, violence continue to be used as a stick when, 
                                               
61 The French national press has been very critical of Jospin's overture and inclusion of the nationalist 
deputies in the talks, as witnessed by the following headline: " Lionel Jospin dans le piège corse" 
("Lionel Jospin in the Corsican trap") (Le Monde, 12-13 March 2000); an article in the French weekly 
L'Express from 27 July 2000 states "the first error [committed by the Prime Minister] was to give in to 
the blackmail of violence by inviting after the bomb attacks of November 1999 all the elected 
representatives of Corsica, including the separatists of Corsica Nazione, to come to Matignon to 
negotiate... . " (Christophe Barbier and Eric Conan, "Jospin le funambule," L'Express, 27 July 2000).  
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following the adoption by the Corsican Assembly on 28 July of these proposals, the 
triumphant nationalists deputies seemed to threaten a renewal of violence if the 
Government did not deliver on its promises.  Whether or not the use of violence had 
been calculated with such skill in the case of the Matignon Process, it was certainly 
perceived as having been by other French regions prone to separatist violence, namely 
Brittany and also the French Basque country. Indeed, the moderates of the Basque 
National Party as well as the separatist AB (Abertzale Batasuna / Union of Patriots) 
stated that they were dismayed that the Corsicans had succeeded in obtaining major 
concessions through the use of violence.  
 
What will be the impact on other French regions? Will the French Government face a 
chain-reaction effect in other regions?  Within days of the 20 July proposals, cracks in 
the "one and indivisible" Republic began to appear: the Britons were the first to react, 
with the UDB (Union démocratique bretonne) stating on 21 July that the proposals 
for Corsica represented a tremendous encouragement and that an autonomy statute for 
Brittany would be a major political issue in the 2004 regional elections.  Similar 
reactions were also heard in the Basque Country, Alsace and Savoie.  The proposals 
are also of great interest for the French Overseas Departments (DOM).  Three of them 
(Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyana) have called for the replacement of their current 
mono-departmental institutional structure (with a regional assembly and one 
departmental council), by a single region with an assembly— exactly what the French 
Government has agreed to in the case of Corsica.62 The French Basque Country is 
also interested in the institutional reforms for it has been calling for the creation of a 
single Basque department in France (not a unification of the French and Spanish 
Basque regions). Support is building in Paris for taking into account the specificity of 
individual regions and developing asymmetrical solutions rather than opting for 
uniformity;63 on the other hand, some politicians have called for a second wave of 
decentralisation.  Certainly, other French regions could benefit from greater 
                                               
62 This will necessitate a revision of the French Constitution because of a 1982 ruling by the 
Constitutional Council that the department is the lowest administrative entity and that therefore to have 
an administrative unit without a department would be contrary to the French Constitution. Of particular 
interest therefore to the DOM is the acceptance of Corsican demands for abolishing the two 
departments, despite the Government's clearly stated preference for a single body alternating as a 
regional assembly and as a departmental council. 
63 Guy Carcassone, "Le sacrifice de l'uniformité", Le Point 28 July 2000. 
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involvement in the decisions and laws affecting them.  However, to downplay the 
specific needs and features of  Corsica by extending the same measures to all French 
regions would be demeaning and might jeopardise the whole process.  
* * * 
The European state has been undergoing profound changes, as its authority and 
powers have been eroded from three directions: from above by globalisation, from 
below by regional and local assertion, and laterally by the advance of the market and 
civil society.  With the process of European Integration, states have had to rethink the 
very notion of national sovereignty and identity. Due to the pressures of globalisation, 
the state has lost its monopoly on defining and reproducing a national culture. 
Demands for more power for the regions are still perceived by a large portion of the 
political class as a threat against the unity and indivisibility of the French Republic.  
Not only is the French State undergoing a period of crisis, but so is French identity 
itself.  Despite the decentralisation reforms of 1982, and the special statute for Corsica 
in 1991, France is still governed in a very centralised fashion where regions possess 
only limited competencies and no legislative power whatsoever. There is an important 
rift in the French political class between the "nationaux-républicans" or 
"souverainistes" and the régionalistes who are in favour of recognising the diversity 
of the country are holding back evolution of the French State.  These divisions cut 
across political affiliations and threaten at times to cause a governmental crisis.  The 
intensity of the debates on whether or not France should ratify the Council of Europe's 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which it had just signed in 
May 1999, testified to the importance of this rift.   
 
We are finally witnessing a slow recognition by France of diversity, exemplified by 
recent developments in Corsica where a serious effort has been undertaken to settle 
the conflict.  These events indicate increased openness to novel and asymmetric 
solutions, including a subject long considered taboo and contrary to the founding 
principles of the French Republic: autonomy.  It remains to be seen whether this was 
merely a political ploy or whether this signals the end of the single institutional model 
and the beginning of a new era where France can demonstrate that it is has deserves to 
play a central role in European affairs. 
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TABLE 1 
 
APPLICATION OF AUTONOMY SUCCESS CRITERIA  
TO THE CASES OF ÅLAND AND CORSICA* 
 
"Ingredient for Success" Present in Åland? Present in  
Corsica? 
1. A regime of autonomy should be established 
with the consent of the population intended to 
benefit from it.  
Yes Not yet; a referendum 
needs to be organised.  
2. The regime should be established with the 
consent, express or implied, of a foreign state to 
which the autonomous group may have an ethnic 
or other affiliation. 
Yes.  
Sweden agreed.  
N.A. 
(in the 19th century 
Italy could have been 
considered) 
3. The regime should be beneficial for both the 
state and the population of the autonomous 
region. 
Yes.  Probably yes. 
4. The local population should be permitted to 
enjoy the formal or symbolic paraphernalia of 
self-determination, such as a flag, an anthem, 
and an officially-recognised language. 
Yes 
The fact that 
Swedish is an official 
language in Finland 
was a facilitating 
factor.  
Highly improbable. 
The "Corsican people" 
has not been 
recognised.  
5. The division of powers should be defined as 
clearly as possible.  
Yes, but this was the 
result of several 
revisions.  
Probably yes, but it 
will be a significant 
challenge. 
Administrative 
simplification will 
greatly facilitate this. 
6. If activities of the central government in spheres 
that are under its authority directly affect the 
autonomous region, the local authorities should, 
if possible, be consulted. 
Yes Yes, if  a similar 
provision to article 26 
of the 1991 statute is 
applied. 
7. An organ for cooperation between the central 
government and the local authorities should be 
established.  
Yes  
(The Åland 
Delegation) 
None so far. This 
might be a major 
deficiency. 
8. Modes and mechanisms for settling disputes 
between the centre and the local authorities 
should be established, with a maximum of detail. 
Yes Only the State Council 
(Conseil d'Etat) can 
adjudicate 
9. Under certain circumstances it may be preferable 
to establish the autonomy in stages, that is, to 
transfer the relevant powers (and perhaps also 
the territory involved) gradually.  
Yes (see 1991 
Autonomy Act) 
Possibly. Two stages 
have been defined 
(2000-2002, and 2002-
2004) but a 15 year 
time frame as in New 
Caledonia is highly 
improbable.   
10. The prospects for success are greater if both the 
central government and the autonomous 
authorities are based on democratic regimes. 
Yes Yes, both are 
democratic, although 
because of widespread 
fraud and nationalist 
threat of violence, this 
statement must be 
somewhat qualified. 
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11. Every regime of autonomy must include 
guarantees  for the respect of human rights, 
including the principle of equality and non-
discrimination among all the inhabitants. 
Similarly, a minority that lives within an ethnic 
group that has been granted autonomy should 
enjoy minority rights. 
Yes Yes, the French 
Constitution upholds 
the principles of 
equality and non-
discrimination. 
12. A rather similar stage of economic development 
and standard of living in the autonomous region 
and in the state as a whole may enhance the 
chance of success. 
No (but yes on 
individual level; 
however, there exist 
mechanisms for 
redistribution of 
additional income 
from taxes on 
Åland).   
Corsica is one of the 
least developed 
regions of France  
13. If autonomy is established for a limited period, 
the procedure to be followed at the end of that 
period should be established. If possible, a list of 
tentative options to be considered at that stage 
should be drafted. 
N.A. N.A. See point 9.  
14. If the autonomy arrangement includes a 
commitment to certain rules of behaviour, it may 
be helpful if those rules can be based on 
international norms. 
N.A. The Corsican conflict 
is a purely internal 
affair, and no reference 
to international norms 
on minority or 
language rights is 
possible in the case of 
France.   
15. The most important and indispensable condition 
for a successful autonomy is a prevailing 
atmosphere of conciliation and goodwill. This 
condition must be generated by an energetic and 
sustained effort to explain and to engage in 
patient dialogue.    
Yes Probably yes. There 
has been much effort 
to show goodwill by 
both the Prime 
Minister and the 
Corsican deputies. But 
this is not the case of 
the whole Government 
nor of the nationalists 
and some other 
Corsican deputies.  
16. Autonomy should be established before the 
relations between the majority in the state and 
the majority in the region deteriorate 
considerably. If there is hatred and frustration, it 
is too late, and autonomy will not be able to 
soothe the strained atmosphere.   
Yes Unclear whether it is 
"too late". At least, 
there is not hatred 
between  the French 
and Corsicans, but 
rather indifference.  
* The success criteria are from Lapidoth (1997: 199-201).  
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ANNEX 1: Administrative Structure of Corsica 
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ANNEX 2 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN CORSICA 
 
· Gauche « plurielle » / pluralist left: at both the national level and in Corsica, it unites the 
Socialist Party / Parti socialiste (PS), the French Communist Party / Parti communiste 
français (PCF), the Citizens’ Movement / Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), which is the 
Jacobin party of Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, and the Left Radicals / Parti 
des Radicaux de Gauche (PRG) of Minister Emile Zuccarelli.   
 
· Other Corsican left wing parties which are not part of the gauche « plurielle » 
government coalition include: 
- Mouvement pour la Corse is a centre-left party, led by Toussaint Luciani.  
- Corse Social démocrate is a citizens’ movement, rather than a political party, and is led 
by the charismatic Ajaccio paediatrician Simon Renucci (formerly of the Socialist Party). 
 
· Regionalists, autonomists and pro-independence nationalist parties:   
- Unione di u Populu Corsu / Union of Corsican People (UPC). Long the leading 
autonomist party, led by the Simeoni brothers, it has undergone difficult periods 
following the forced retirement of Edmond Simeoni in the 1980s due to illness and recent 
internal divisions.  
- Corsica Nazione is the leading nationalist electoral list and is basically identical to A 
Cuncolta Naziunalista (CN) since the other three parties which originally belonged to this 
coalition in the 1992 elections, Accolta Naziunale Corsa (ANC) UPC and I Verdi Corsi, 
withdrew. 
- Corsica Viva is a young nationalist movement which formally denounces the use of 
violence and with a strong basis in university circles as well as dissidents from more 
radical nationalist groups. A splinter group, Rinnovu Naziunale / National Renewal, was 
formed in early 1999 before the regional elections. 
- Muvimentu pà l’Autodeterminazione / Movement for Self-determination (MPA) is a 
nationalist party generally in favour of the Joxe Statute and the federalism proposed of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
- Manca Naziunale is the only truly left-oriented nationalist party.  
- The women’s list of Pascale Bizzari represented Pauline Sallembien’s movement 51 
femmes pour une Corse de l’an 2000 (51 Women for a Corsica of the year 2000) which 
did not succeed in obtaining the minimum 5% to reach the second round. They were 
however satisfied with the results of this very new movement which was born in the 
aftermath of Prefect Erignac’s assassination in February 1998.  
- I Verdi Corsi / Corsican Greens. 
 
· The Traditional Right 
- Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). The right-wing Gaullist party of President 
Jacques Chirac and President of the Executive Council of Corsica Jean Baggioni.  
- Démocratie libérale (DL): the right-of-centre coalition party of José Rossi, President of 
the Corsican Assembly. It is affiliated with the UDF on the national level. In the 1999 
elections, in a show of unity in the right, Baggioni and Rossi presented a joint list under 
the title “Une majorité pour la Corse”.  
 
· Other Right Wing Parties:  
- Philippe Ceccaldi’s party Corse Nouvelle is a right wing, neo-Bonapartist traditionalist 
party. 
- Front National (FN). France’s far-right party has always failed to reach the same level of 
support in Corsica as in the rest of France. 
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ANNEX 3 
A GENEALOGY OF CORSICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS  
AND CLANDESTINE GROUPS 1 
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NOTES 
 
1. This diagram does not claim to be exhaustive nor up-to-date and is indicative only of the complex 
history of regionalist, autonomist and nationalist movements in Corsica. It is mostly based on 
articles which have appeared in the French press, in particular the daily Libération and the weekly 
L’Express as well as a book entitled Le Nationalisme corse – genèse, succès et échec by 
Emmanuel Bernabéu-Casanova, Paris : L’Harmattan, 1997. See also the diagrams in Claude 
Olivesi, “The Failure of Regionalist Party Formation in Corsica”, In: Lieven de Winter and Huri 
Türsan (eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 
p.181; and in Pierre Poggioli, Journal de Bord d’un Nationaliste Corse (Saint-Etienne: L’Aube, 
1996), p. 38. Thanks also goes to Dominique Ferrandini for his comments. The full names of the 
various organisations are given either in French or, when available, in Corsican, for reasons of 
space. The dates indicate founding and dissolution, where applicable. 
 
2. ARC - Action Régionaliste Corse, changed its name in 1973 to Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa. It 
was dissolved by the French Council of Ministers on 28 August 1975. 
 
3. FRC - Front Régionaliste Corse, changed its name in 1973 to Partitu Popularu Corsu (PPC). 
 
4. FLNC - Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica or, in French, Front de Libération Nationale 
de la Corse. In 1983, when the FLNC was dissolved by the French government, it persisted as a 
clandestine movement and was referred to as the “ex-FLNC.” 
 
5. APC - Associu di i Patrioti Corsi was founded in early 1976 by Max Simeoni with similar 
objectives to the ARC: autonomy within the French state and the legal recognition of the “peuple 
corse”. The use of violence is rejected outright. In 1977, the APC changed its name to the Unione 
di u Populu Corsu (UPC), led by Max Simeoni and his brother, Edmondu. 
 
6. The actual name of this movement, considered the main clandestine organisation in Corsica, is 
FLNC-historique but it is commonly called FLNC-Canal historique (historic channel), as a 
counterpart to the FLNC-Canal habituel (usual channel).  
 
7. Two movements which need to be mentioned here, as predecessors to CN, are the Cunsulta di i 
Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN) (1980-1983); and the Muvimentu Corsu pà l’Autodeterminazione 
(MCA) (1983-1987). 
 
8. Despite its short period of existence, Armata Corsa has already claimed a whole series of terrorist 
acts, including one murder, which is threatening the fragile nationalist reconciliation (following an 
initiative by the Fium’Orbu Committee at the beginning of 1999 which gathered 14 nationalist 
movements and resulted in an agreement on 3 July to put an end to the use of violence between 
nationalists in Corsica). Armata Corsa claims to have 200 members and is very critical of the 
FLNC-Canal historique. Its suspected leaders are dissident former members of the  FLNC. 
 
9. Also referred to as the “FLNC of 5 May 1996” to avoid confusion with the FLNC-Canal 
historique and the FLNC-Canal habituel.  
 
10. The "new FLNC" was created by fusion of four groups on 24 December 1999: FLNC-Canal 
historique, FLNC "du 5 mai", Fronte Ribellu and Clandestinu. 
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ANNEX 4 
 
PROPOSITIONS DU GOUVERNEMENT SOUMISES AUX REPRESENTANTS  
DES ELUS DE LA CORSE* 
 
Paris, le 20 juillet 2000 
 
Les discussions qui ont eu lieu depuis le 13 décembre 1999 entre le Gouvernement et 
des représentants élus de la Corse ont conduit le Gouvernement aux conclusions 
suivantes, qui doivent permettre l’aboutissement positif de ces discussions. 
Afin de mieux prendre en compte les spécificités de la Corse dans la République, 
tenant à sa situation insulaire et à son histoire, ainsi que les enseignements de 
l’application de son statut particulier et dans le but de clarifier les responsabilités dans 
la gestion des affaires de l’île, de favoriser son développement économique et social 
et de fonder durablement la paix civile :  
· Des réformes seront proposées dans les domaines suivants :  
- l’organisation administrative de la Corse et les compétences de la collectivité 
territoriale ; 
- le statut fiscal, la fiscalité sur les successions et le financement de l’économie; 
· l’enseignement de la langue corse. 
· Un projet de loi de programmation sera élaboré, pour permettre une mise à 
niveau des infrastructures publiques.  
· Des discussions seront engagées avec la Commission européenne, sur la base 
du document annexé, élaboré conjointement.  
 
1- L’organisation administrative de la Corse et les compétences de la collectivité 
territoriale : 
La simplification de l’organisation administrative :  
L’existence d’une collectivité territoriale et de deux départements pour 
l’administration de la Corse ne favorise ni la clarification des responsabilités, ni 
l’efficacité de la gestion. 
Une première solution, pour laquelle le Gouvernement avait exprimé une préférence, 
parce qu’elle semblait pouvoir être menée à terme sans révision de la Constitution, 
consistait dans la suppression d’un département. Le département désormais unique et 
la collectivité territoriale auraient eu une assemblée et un exécutif communs. 
Lors de la réunion des présidents de groupe de l’assemblée de Corse, une préférence 
s’est nettement exprimée pour la suppression des deux départements et la mise en 
                                               
* See website of the French Government at http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/FAIT/JUILLET00/ 
210700.HTM#anchor15. 
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place d’une collectivité unique, cette réforme ne devant intervenir qu’à l’expiration 
du mandat de l’assemblée de Corse, en 2004.  
Le Gouvernement est disposé à se placer dans cette perspective, tout en relevant que 
celle-ci n’a pas à être concrétisée durant la présente législature et qu’elle impliquerait 
une révision constitutionnelle. 
La suppression envisagée des départements ne devrait porter atteinte ni à la qualité du 
service public, ni à l’équilibre entre les parties de la Corse. L’organisation et 
l’implantation des services de l’Etat et de la collectivité territoriale devraient tenir 
compte de ces impératifs.  
La réorganisation des services serait alors conduite en concertation avec les 
organisations représentatives des personnels. 
Tant que les trois collectivités subsisteront, la collectivité territoriale de Corse pourra 
mettre en place avec les deux départements un dispositif de coordination de leurs 
politiques, dans le respect des compétences de chacun. 
Une amélioration de l’organisation des institutions de la collectivité territoriale devra 
également être recherchée. 
La décentralisation de nouvelles compétences :  
De nouvelles compétences seront décentralisées au profit de la collectivité territoriale 
de Corse.  
Elles pourraient concerner les champs d’activité suivants : 
· l’aménagement de l’espace,  
· le développement économique,  
· l’éducation,  
· la formation professionnelle,  
· les sports,  
· le tourisme,  
· la protection de l’environnement,  
· la gestion des infrastructures et des services de proximité,  
· les transports.  
Ces transferts de compétences seront opérés avec le souci de favoriser la constitution 
de " blocs de compétences " cohérents. Des discussions ultérieures entre le 
Gouvernement et les élus de Corse permettront d’en préciser les contenus. 
L’organisation des services de l’Etat sera modifiée, après concertation avec les 
organisations syndicales, pour tenir compte des transferts de compétences réalisés. 
L’Etat conservera dans tous les cas la capacité de mettre en œ uvre les politiques 
nationales et d’exercer ses missions de contrôle. 
L’adaptation des normes :  
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Les spécificités de la Corse peuvent justifier que des normes réglementaires voire 
certaines dispositions législatives soient adaptées à la Corse.  
Le statut actuel de la Corse prévoit déjà, dans son article 26, que " L’assemblée de 
Corse peut présenter des propositions tendant à modifier ou adapter des dispositions 
législatives ou réglementaires en vigueur ou en cours d’élaboration concernant les 
compétences, l’organisation et le fonctionnement de l’ensemble des collectivités 
territoriales de Corse, ainsi que toutes dispositions législatives ou réglementaires 
concernant le développement économique, social et culturel de la Corse ".  
Ce mécanisme n’a pas fonctionné. Il apparaît aujourd’hui que cette faculté 
d’adaptation, qui est nécessaire, serait mieux mise en œ uvre si la collectivité 
territoriale de Corse pouvait procéder à certaines adaptations par les délibérations de 
son assemblée, dans des conditions qui seraient déterminées par la loi. 
Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement de doter la collectivité territoriale de Corse 
d’un pouvoir réglementaire, permettant d’adapter les textes réglementaires par 
délibération de l’assemblée. 
S’agissant de l’adaptation de dispositions législatives, le Gouvernement proposera au 
Parlement de donner à la collectivité territoriale de Corse la possibilité de déroger, 
par ses délibérations, à certaines dispositions législatives, dans des conditions que le 
Parlement définirait, les adaptations ainsi intervenues à l’initiative de l’assemblée 
devant, comme le prévoit la décision n° 93-322 du conseil constitutionnel du 28 
juillet 1993 qui affirme la conformité à la Constitution de telles expérimentations, être 
ensuite évaluées avant que le Parlement ne décide de les maintenir, de les modifier ou 
de les abandonner. 
Les élus de l’assemblée de Corse ont également exprimé le souhait qu’au-delà de 
cette procédure autorisant des délégations temporaires par le Parlement du pouvoir de 
déroger à des dispositions législatives, et à l’issue de ce qu’ils qualifient de période 
transitoire s’achevant avec la mise en place de la collectivité unique, soit reconnue de 
manière permanente à la collectivité territoriale de Corse la possibilité d’adapter par 
ses délibérations des dispositions législatives, selon des principes généraux et dans 
des conditions fixées par le Parlement.  
Dans cet esprit, il peut apparaître cohérent avec une démarche de responsabilisation 
des institutions de la Corse d’envisager l’élargissement et la pérennisation du 
dispositif qui aurait été mis en œ uvre sur la base de la décision du conseil 
constitutionnel du 28 juillet 1993. Le Parlement pourrait ainsi autoriser l’assemblée 
territoriale de Corse à adapter par ses délibérations, dans certains domaines 
précisément déterminés et dans le respect des principes qu’il aura fixés, des 
dispositions législatives déjà en vigueur ou en cours d’examen. Les délibérations 
adoptées par l’assemblée de Corse dans ces conditions seraient, sous réserve de 
l’exercice des voies de recours devant la juridiction administrative, exécutoires. De 
valeur réglementaire, elles ne seraient pas soumises à une validation ultérieure 
obligatoire de la part du législateur.  
Il est certain toutefois que l’attribution à la collectivité de Corse d’une telle faculté 
d’adaptation de mesures législatives, en dehors de la procédure décrite par la décision 
du conseil constitutionnel du 28 juillet 1993, nécessiterait une révision préalable de la 
Constitution. Celle-ci serait entreprise au regard du bilan des adaptations déjà 
réalisées d’ici 2004. 
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Il est bien entendu que les révisions constitutionnelles ci-dessus envisagées 
supposeraient l’accord des pouvoirs publics alors en fonction. Elles nécessiteraient en 
tout état de cause le rétablissement durable de la paix civile. 
 
2- Le statut fiscal, la fiscalité sur les successions et le financement de l’économie : 
Le statut fiscal :  
le dispositif d’incitation à l’investissement  
L’objectif de développement économique de la Corse doit guider la définition du 
statut fiscal appelé à succéder à la zone franche, à compter de janvier 2002. 
Ce statut doit bénéficier d’une certaine stabilité dans le temps, viser la réalisation 
d’objectifs de nature économique et sociale et faire l’objet d’une évaluation 
périodique conduisant, en tant que de besoin, à des adaptations. 
Le coût des exonérations devra tenir dans une enveloppe constante, telle qu’elle peut 
être évaluée aujourd’hui. 
Les objectifs prioritaires sont : 
- la relance de l’investissement et le développement de la capacité de production de 
l’économie de la Corse dans des secteurs définis comme prioritaires : hôtellerie, 
nouvelles technologies, industrie, énergie. 
- le développement économique des zones défavorisées de l’intérieur de l’île.  
Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement d’inciter à l’investissement dans les 
secteurs prioritaires de l’économie de la Corse par un mécanisme reposant sur un 
crédit d’impôt, égal à un pourcentage à déterminer de l’investissement réalisé. Ce 
crédit d’impôt serait reportable et partiellement remboursable, au terme d’une période 
à déterminer.  
Ce dispositif de soutien à l’investissement en Corse aura vocation à s’appliquer 
pendant 10 ans, sous réserve de l’agrément communautaire. 
b) la fiscalité indirecte  
La situation actuelle se caractérise par des taux particuliers de TVA, une affectation 
de 3 % des recettes de TIPP aux départements et de 10 % à la collectivité territoriale 
de Corse, une affectation totale à la celle-ci des droits sur les alcools, une affectation 
de 25 % des droits sur les tabacs aux départements et 75 % à la collectivité territoriale 
de Corse, leur taux étant réduit par rapport au continent. Au total, l’ensemble de ces 
dispositions se traduit chaque année par une contribution du budget de l’Etat de 930 
MF.  
Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement : 
- de maintenir le dispositif existant, sous réserve de sa conformité aux règles 
communautaires  
· de remplacer le transfert des droits sur les alcools par un transfert équivalent 
de TIPP.  
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La part de la TIPP transférée au profit de la collectivité pourra être accrue pour tenir 
compte notamment de la charge résultant des compétences nouvelles qui lui seront 
transférées.  
B La fiscalité sur les successions :  
Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement le dispositif suivant : 
- le principe de l’obligation de déclaration de succession s’appliquera pour les 
successions ouvertes à compter du 1er janvier 2001 ; 
- la reconstitution des titres de propriété sera effectuée au cours d’une période 
transitoire de 10 ans ; pendant cette période, des mesures d’aide à l’expertise seront 
financées avec le concours de la collectivité et de l’Etat ; l’exonération des droits de 
licitation et de partage ainsi que des droits sur les procurations et les attestations 
notariées après décès sera reconduite ;  
- pendant cette période de 10 ans, l’exonération des droits sera complète. Pour une 
deuxième période, d’une durée de 5 ans, un dispositif comportant une réfaction de 
50% sur la valeur des immeubles sis en Corse sera mis en place pour les successions ;  
- le délai de dépôt des déclarations de succession sera allongé pendant la période 
transitoire de 10 ans pour permettre, quand c’est nécessaire, la reconstitution des 
titres de propriété ; 
· Le bénéfice des dispositions précédentes sera conditionné par la 
reconstitution des titres de propriété, lorsqu’ils font défaut ;  
· la définition du régime fiscal applicable aux successions à l’issue de ces deux 
périodes transitoires, de 15 ans au total, fera l’objet d’une concertation entre 
la collectivité et l’Etat.  
C - le financement de l’économie  
a) Le capital risque 
Le capital de la société de capital risque " Femu Qui " sera porté de 4 à 23 MF afin de 
permettre d’accroître ses interventions. Des solutions adaptées à ses difficultés de 
fonctionnement seront recherchées.  
b) Le financement bancaire 
Un dispositif renforcé de garantie (SOFARIS-région) est en cours de mise en place 
avec le concours de la BDPME, de la Collectivité de Corse et de fonds 
communautaires. 
Le Gouvernement souhaite l’installation de la BDPME en Corse, celle-ci paraissant 
susceptible de contribuer à la dynamisation du système bancaire. 
c) Le crédit bail 
La présence d’un organisme de crédit bail sera encouragée en Corse ; celui-ci pourrait 
être Corsa Bail, sous réserve du rachat de ses parts par des investisseurs privés.  
 
3- L’enseignement de la langue corse : 
 71
Les élus de l’assemblée de Corse ont unanimement demandé la définition d’un 
dispositif permettant d’assurer un enseignement généralisé de la langue corse dans 
l’enseignement maternel et primaire, de manière à favoriser la vitalité de cette langue.  
Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement le vote d’une disposition posant le principe 
selon lequel l’enseignement de la langue corse prendra place dans l’horaire scolaire 
normal des écoles maternelles et primaires et pourra ainsi être suivi par tous les 
élèves, sauf volonté contraire des parents. 
Pour atteindre l’objectif recherché, il est nécessaire d’accroître le nombre des 
enseignants du premier degré formés à l’enseignement de la langue corse.  
Il est ainsi prévu : 
- de donner une forte impulsion à la formation initiale et continue en langue corse des 
enseignants du premier degré. Les professeurs des écoles seraient recrutés à leur 
choix par deux concours, dont l’un comporterait des épreuves de langue corse ;  
- de recourir davantage à l’intervention des enseignants de langue corse du second 
degré, en augmentant, si besoin est, le nombre de postes ouverts au CAPES de langue 
corse, ainsi qu’à des intervenants extérieurs et à des aides-éducateurs recrutés sur le 
profil " langue et culture corse ". 
 
4 - Une loi de programmation : 
Le Gouvernement proposera au Parlement de voter un dispositif législatif prévoyant 
une programmation sur 15 ans d’investissements publics destinés à combler les 
retards d’équipements dont la Corse souffre encore dans plusieurs secteurs. Ces 
investissements seront financés par l’Etat et la collectivité de Corse, selon des 
proportions tenant compte des capacités de financement de la collectivité ; en 
moyenne 70% seront à la charge de l’Etat.  
La programmation portera notamment sur les grandes opérations d’infrastructures 
routières et ferroviaires nécessaires au désenclavement des territoires.  
La mise au point de cette programmation sera effectuée en concertation entre le préfet 
de Corse, qui recevra un mandat du Gouvernement, et la collectivité territoriale. 
Un dispositif d’assistance à l’ingénierie publique sera mis en place. 
 
5- Calendrier législatif :  
Afin d’assurer la mise en œ uvre de celles des propositions ci-dessus qui appellent des 
mesures législatives pendant la présente législature, le Gouvernement élaborera un 
projet de loi, qui pourrait être déposé devant le Parlement avant la fin de l’année pour 
être voté en 2001. Les mesures relatives à la fiscalité sur les successions feront l’objet 
de dispositions fiscales spécifiques pour être mises en œ uvre à partir du 1er janvier 
2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
